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I.

INTRODUCTION

In

2002, in Atkins v. Virginia,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that subjecting persons with intellectual disabilities to the
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. 2 Since 2002, the
Court has returned to this question multiple times, clarifying that
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1.

536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002).

2.

At the time of the Atkins case, the phrase "mental retardation" was used. Id. at 306.

Twelve years later, in the case of Hall v. Florida, the Court chose to use the phrase "intellectual disability" rather than "mental retardation" in all future cases to conform with changes
in the U.S. Code and in the most recent version of the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990
(2014). "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving
standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that
the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a
mentally retarded offender." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. This decision came only sixteen years
after the Court rejected similar arguments in Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). For a
spellbinding account of how advocates and advocacy groups persuaded state legislatures to
outlaw the death penalty in such cases (one of the major reasons the Supreme Court did
an about face after Penry), see James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty: The

Road from Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173 (2003).
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inquiries into defendants' intellectual disabilities for purposes of
determining whether they are potentially subject to the death penalty cannot be limited to a bare numerical "reading" of an intelligence quotient ("IQ") score,3 and that state rules based on superseded medical standards unacceptably risk executing persons with
intellectual disabilities in violation of the Eighth Amendment.4
Atkins and its progeny spawned a cottage industry of commentary on multiple related issues, including the following:
> the ability of counsel and judges to understand the
meaning of intellectual disabilities; 5
> the importance of cultural competency in the process of litigating on behalf of capital defendants with
intellectual disabilities; 6
> the ways that failure to develop evidence of intellectual disability are treated in effectiveness-of-counsel
cases; 7

3.

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990; see also Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015)

(holding that a state post-conviction court's determination that prisoner's IQ score of 75
demonstrated that he could not possess subaverage intelligence reflected an unreasonable
determination of the facts).
4.

Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017) (Moore ]). Two years later, the Su-

preme Court returned to Moore's case once again, restating its decision, and criticizing the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (that had reinstated the death penalty in Moore's case in
the interim) for relying on "lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled." Moore v. Texas,
139 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2019) (Moore I1). Those stereotypes emerged from the Texas Court's
decision in Ex parteBriseno, which included seven evidentiary factors that it had articulated
without any citation "to any authority, medical orjudicial." MooreI, 137 S. Ct. at 1046 (citing

135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). These factors were largely based on the depiction of a character in John Steinbeck's novel, Of Mice and Men. See Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court to ConsiderLegal Standard Drawn from 'Of Mice and Men, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/us/politics/supreme-court-to-consider-legalstandard-drawn-from-of-mice-and-men.html. We discuss the implications of the Briseno factors extensively. See infra note 100.

5. James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and Atkins, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 653, 656-64
(2008); see Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: CapitalJurySelectionfor the Mentally

Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 701 (2008) (discussing
judicial comprehension); Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying IntellectualDisabilities
to Judge andJury, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 467 (2014).
6. Jeffrey Omar Usman, CapitalPunishment, Cultural Competency, andLitigatingIntellectual Disability, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 855, 885-904 (2012); see Michael L. Perlin & Valerie R.
McClain, "Where Souls Are Forgotten": Cultural Competencies, ForensicEvaluations and Interna-

tionalHuman Rights, 15 PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 257 (2009) (discussing why expert witnesses
also need this cultural competency).
7. Rebecca Klaren & Irene Merker Rosenberg, SplittingHairs in Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Cases:An Essay on How IneffectiveAssistance of CounselDoctrineUndermines the Prohibition

Against Executing the Mentally Retarded, 31 AM.J. CRIM. L. 339, 348-66 (2004); see Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Michael L. Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon & Sarah
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the underlying sanism of jurors in assessing intellectual disabilities;8
the pretextuality of so many judges in assessing such
cases; 9
the capacity ofjurors to empathize with persons with
intellectual disabilities; 10
the role of experts in explaining:
o the meanings of IQs," functional abilities, capacity for moral development, etc., of persons
with intellectual disability; 12

Chatt, "A World of Steel-Eyed Death": An EmpiricalEvaluationof the Failureof the Strickland Standard to EnsureAdequate Counsel to Defendants with Mental DisabilitiesFacing the Death Penalty, 53

U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 261, 296-97 (2020) (discussing how the Fifth Circuit has dealt with
effectiveness of counsel claims in the context of Strickland).
8. Sanism is "an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry." See Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives ofjurors in Death

Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of MitigatingMental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L.,

&

&

ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239, 257 (1994) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanist Lives]. For further discussion on sanism in the context of persons with intellectual disabilities, see Keri K. Gould, And
Equal Participationfr All ...
The Americans With Disabilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L.
HEALTH 123, 140-41 (1994). For further discussion on sanism and the death penalty in
general, seeJohn W. Parry, The Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities:A Lethal Dose
of Stigma, Sanism, Fear of Violence, and Faulty Predictions of Dangerousness, 29 MENTAL
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 667 (2005); see also Lyon, supra note 5.
9.

See Michael L. Perlin, "Merchants and Thieves, Hungry fr Power": ProsecutorialMis-

conduct and PassiveJudicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trials of Defendants with Mental Disabili-

ties, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1506 n.19 (2016) (discussing the consistently pretextual
positions of four current Supreme Court judges in all matters dealing with the overlap between mental disability and criminal behavior, culminating injustice Alito's bizarre dissent
in Hall [v. Florida].") [hereinafter Perlin, Merchants and Thieves]; see infra notes 95-96 (dis-

cussing Justice Alito's dissent further). See also Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice
Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental DisabilityLaw Developed as It Did,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999) (discussing pretextuality further). We define "pretextuality" as "the ways in which courts accept testimonial dishonesty-especially by expert
witnesses-and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-making." Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7, at 280 n.117.
10.

See Denise Paquette Boots, Kathleen M. Heide & John K. Cochran, Death Penalty

Supportf]r Special Oftender Populationsof Legally Convicted Murderers:Juveniles, the Mentally Retarded, and the Mentally Incompetent, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 223 (2004).
11.

Daniel B. Kessler, Atkins v. Virginia: Suggestionsfar the Accurate Diagnosis of Mental

Retardation, 43JURIMETRICSJ. 415, 424-26 (2003).
12. SeeJohn M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the ForensicPsychologist,
27 L. & PSYCH. REV. 73 (2003).
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the potential for misuse of "ethnic adjustments" to make certain persons with lower
IQs eligible for the death penalty;1 3 and
o the extent to which judges can adequately understand such expert testimony;1 4
the willingness of trial judges to enforce Atkins;1 5 and
the extent to which the fear-of-faking concern is
valid, which Justice Scalia focused on in his Atkins dissent. 16

Atkins' victory-and the victories of other defendants with
intellectual disabilities in subsequent Supreme Court cases 17may
be illusory unless we look carefully at these issues and a constellation of other legal, social, and behavioral issues that poisoned this
area of the law for decades. Atkins gives us a blueprint, but the question remains as to whether the case will, in the long run, be more
than a "paper victory." 8 Until these issues are carefully considered,
the true legacy of Atkins and its progeny will not be clear, and it will
similarly be unclear if the case's "revolutionary potential" will be

fulfilled. 19

13.

Robert M. Sanger, IQ Intelligence Tests, "EthnicAdjustments, " andAtkins, 65 AM. U.

L. REV. 87, 108-16 (2015); David L. Shapiro et al., Ethnic Adjustment Abuses in ForensicAssess-

ment ofIntellectualAbilities, 4 PRAC. INNOVATIONS 265 (2019); Michael L. Perlin, "Your Corrupt
Ways Had Finally Made You Blind": ProsecutorialMisconduct and the Use of "EthnicAdjustments"

in Death Penalty Cases ofDefendants with IntellectualDisabilities, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1437 (2016)
[hereinafter Perlin, Corrupt Ways].
14. James W. Ellis, Caroline Everington & Ann M. Delpha, EvaluatingIntellectualDisability: Clinical Assessments in Atkins Cases, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1424-26 (2018); see also
Everington, supra note 5.

15. Joseph A. Migliozzi, Jr. & Ashley Hughes, Atkins Test

orExcluding IntellectuallyDis-

abled Persons from Execution Withstands Barrageof Challenges by State Courts, 30 REGENT U. L.
REV. 135, 142-48 (2017); see Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7 (discussing trial judges'
failure/refusal to implement other Supreme Court decisions in cases involving defendants
with mental disabilities facing the death penalty).
16.

Bridget M. Doane & Karen L. Salekin, Susceptibility of Current Adaptive Behavior

Measures to FeignedDeficits, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 329, 329-31 (2009). See generally MICHAEL
L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAw: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,

§ 17-

4.2.2 (3d ed. 2016) (2020 update).
17. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269
(2015); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (2017) (Moore1); Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666
(2019) (Moore I1).
18. Michael L. Perlin, Life Is in Mirrors, DeathDisappears": GivingLife toAtkins, 33 N.M.
L. REV. 315, 315 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Lie Is in Mirrors].
19.

See Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy ofAtkins and Roper: The UnreliabilityPrinciple,

Mentally IllDeendants, and theDeath Penalty's Unraveling, 23WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 487, 487
(2014).
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In a recent article, two co-authors (Michael L. Perlin and Talia Roitberg Harmon) and a colleague considered all of the death
penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities decided
by the Fifth Circuit in the thirty-six years since Strickland, in an effort
to assess its empirical impact on this population. 20 We found that
the Fifth Circuit's corpus in this area of the law was "bizarre and
frightening,"2 noting that, "in virtually all cases, Strickland errorsoften, egregious errors-were ignored, and in over a third of the
cases in which they were acknowledged, defense counsel had confessed error," 22 concluding that this cohort of cases was "an embarrassment to our system of criminal law and procedure." 2 3
Here, we shift focus but stay with a related database: to what
extent has the Fifth Circuit given meaningful life to Atkins and its
progeny?24 Besides considering the effectiveness of counsel, we will
focus primarily on decisions revolving around the specter of malingering,25 the so-called "Flynn Effect," 2 the type of IQ test given,27
what are now known as ethnic adjustment cases, 2 8 and to a lesser
extent, issues involving adequacy of counsel, 29 and the alleged lack
of remorse. 30 As we will discuss, most of the few "victories" at this

20. See Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (test for adequacy of counsel in criminal cases), discussed infia text accompanying
notes 263-65.
21.

Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supranote 7, at 308.

22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 309.

24. We have limited our analysis to cases from the Fifth Circuit (cases originating from
Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana) for multiple reasons, such as: (1) states in this Circuit,
especially Texas, frequently use the death penalty; (2) a significant number of the most
important death penalty cases that have reached the Supreme Court have come from this
circuit; (3) this circuit has shown a stunning disregard of mitigating evidence in all types of
death cases; and (4) in a similar area, competency to be executed, the Fifth Circuit has
demonstrated an "equally-stunning disregard for constitutional law." Id. at 285.
25.

See generally Ellis, Everington & Delpha, supra note 14.

See, e.g., Geraldine W.Young, A MoreIntelligent andjust Atkins: Adjustingfor the Flynn
Eftect in Capital Determinationsof Mental Retardation or Intellectual Disability, 65 VAND. L. REV.
615 (2012).
27. See, e.g., James Flynn, Tethering the Elephant, 12 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 170
(2006).
26.

28.

See, e.g., Shapiro et al., supra note 13, at 1-2.

29.

See generally Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7.

See, e.g., William Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: OperativeFactors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 51-52 (1988); Perlin,
Merchants and Thieves, supra note 9, at 1530-31 (discussing further how the lack of remorse
can affect the jury's decision).
30.
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level were pyrrhic: cases were remanded or vacated, but the initial
determination was eventually reinstated. 31
In the universe of seventy Atkins cases (that is, cases in the
Fifth Circuit in which colorable Atkins-based arguments had been
raised by defendants on habeas corpus applications), only nine cases
(12%) had actual and meaningful relief granted to defendants
(their sentences were commuted to life in prison, with one of those
defendants having a parole hearing scheduled).32 In forty of the
seventy cases (57%), the Circuit affirmed, denying applications for
writs of habeas corpus in most instances. 33 Eight cases (11%) are
still pending, meaning there was a remand from the Fifth Circuit or
a grant of a certificate of appealability, and further proceedings are
currently taking place or being scheduled. 34 In thirteen cases
(18.5%), although preliminary relief had been granted, defendants
were ultimately unsuccessful. As of the writing of this article, ten
defendants have been executed, one execution has been stayed because of COVID-19-related reasons, one defendant has died in
prison, and one remains on death row. 35 In short, if every one of

31.

See infranote 137 (listing cases where the Atkins claims were partially successful but

ultimately failed).
32. See infra note 130. In two of these nine cases in which preliminary relief was
granted, the defendant died in prison before there was a final disposition of the case (which
is why we cannot characterize that relief as "meaningful"). Thus, there was bonafide relief
in just seven. See infra Appendix B, listing cases.
33.

See infra note 134 (citing several of the forty cases where the Circuit court affirmed

a decision against the defendant).
34.

In all cases in which defendants had bonafide success, the authors have written to

counsel listed on Westlaw as having represented the defendant in the last reported case,
seeking further developments. In some instances, counsel did respond; in others, they did
not. See infra Appendix C.
35.

See infra note 183; see also Michael Graczyk, Michael Wayne HallExecuted For his Role

in Torture-Slaying, CBSN DALLAS - FORT WORTH (Feb 15, 2011, 1:55 PM), https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/02/15/michael-wayne-hall-executed-for-his-role-in-tourture-slaying;

Executes

Yokamon

Hearn

with

Pentobarbitol,

Texas

BBC

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-18897310;

NEWS
(July
19,
2012),
Ed Pilkington Texas Executes Intel-

lectually Disabled Killer Robert Ladd, THE GUARDIAN (Jan 29, 2015, 9:12 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/30/texas-executes-robert-ladd-intellectually-disabled-prisoner; Crimesider, Ricky Lynn Lewis, Convicted Texas Murderer, to be executed
Tuesday; CBS NEWS (Apr. 9, 2013, 11:37 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/ news/rickey-lynnlewis-convicted-texas-murderer-to-be-executed-tuesday; Maldondao v. Thaler, 625 F. 3d 229

(5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 829 (2011) (denying Maldondao a stay of execution);
Texas Death Row Inmate in 25-Year House CaseLoses Appeal, NBC 5 DALLAS-FORT WORTH (Apr.
7, 2015), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/texas-death-row-inmate-in-25-year-houston-case-loses-appeal/1998968 (reporting that John Reyes Matamoros lost his appeal);
John Rudolf, Milton Mathis, Convicted Killer, Executed in Texas Despite Evidence of Retardation,
HUFFPOST (June 21, 2011, 10:10 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/milton-mathis-
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the defendants in pending cases is successful (an outcome that,
based on the Fifth Circuit's track record, is certainly not likely), Atkins'claims will have been successful in just 24% of all cases. 36
Our findings also reveal important patterns as to why certain
defendants were successful,3 7 and why the majority was unsuccessful. Defendants who (1) rebutted allegations of "malingering," 38
(2) raised the Flynn Effect, 39 and (3) relied upon the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale ("WAIS") IQ test,40 were more likely to receive
preliminary relief. On the other hand, the findings revealed that
defendants were less likely to be successful when they used the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale for Children ("WISC") IQ test or
when there was no rebuttal for malingering claims.4 1 It also appeared that partial cases turned into failures when there was no rebuttal provided for malingering claims, when primafacie cases were

executed-killer_n_881885; Michael Graczyk, Man Convicted of Robbery Death Executed in Texas,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2009, 5:15 PM) https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-texas-execution-030409-2009mar04-story.html; Texas Executes Michael Rosales,

KCBD News (Apr. 15, 2009, 10:35 PM), https://www.kcbd.com/story/10191455/texas-executes-michael-rosales/#:-:text=HUNTSVILLE%2C%20TX%20 (KCBD) %20%2D,inside
Paul Stone, Simpson Executed, PALESTINE
%20her%20North%200verton%20home;
HERALD-PRESS (Nov. 18, 2009), https://www.palestineherald.com/news/localnews/simp-

son-executed/article_faa00786-d0f3-51a7-a770-a0dd3b08b6e3.htm; John Rudolf, Marvin
Wilson Execution: Texas Puts Man With 61 IQ to Death, HUFFPOST (Aug. 7, 2012, 8:53 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/marvin-wilson-execution-texasn_1753968;
Chris
McGreal, Texas Executes Man at Centre of Mental Disability Row, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 42009,
10:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/04/texas-execution-mental-

disability-iq.
36. This statistic (9/70) includes the two cases in which clients died before the relief
could be implemented. For an earlier (national) empirical evaluation of Atkins claims, see
John Blume et al., An EmpiricalLook at Atkins v. Virginia and its Application in Capital Cases,

76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 627-28 (2009) (concluding that "Atkins has not opened floodgates of
non-meritorious litigation.") [hereinafter Blume et al., An EmpiricalLook].
37. Here the word "successful" is being used in a broader context. It means that, at
the least, there was some preliminary reliefgrantedunder Atkins, mostly cases in which certificates of appealability were granted. See infra Section III.C.

38. See, e.g., Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65, 66, 71 (5th Cir. 2015); Brumfield
v. Cain, 808 F.3d 1041, 1060 (5th Cir. 2015); Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 221-22 (5th Cir.
2010).
39. See, e.g., Moore, 342 F. App'x at 66, 81-82; Wiley, 625 F.3d at 202-03, 214 (stating
that "the Flynn effect is generally accepted in the scientific community.").
40. See, e.g., Moore, 342 F. App'x at 66, 68; (stating that Atkins names the WAIS test as
"the standard instrument for measuring intellectual functions"); Brumfield, 808 F.3d at 1043,

1047-48; Wiley, 625 F.3d at 202-03.
41.

See infra text accompanying note 162 (noting the only case where the WISC test

was potentially successful in granting preliminary relief).
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made and evidentiary hearings ordered, or when Dr. George Denkowski's discredited testimony was before the court. 42
First, we discuss the Atkins case and the significance of the
post-Atkins cases of Hall, Moore I, and Moore II, focusing on that trilogy's modification of Atkins and its reinforcement of some of Atkins'
most salient points. 43 Following this, we will examine the universe of

Fifth Circuit cases applying (often, misapplying) Atkins, explaining
our methodology and revealing our findings. 44
We then consider this entire area of law and policy through
the lens and filter of therapeutic jurisprudence, 45 and subsequently
apply that doctrine's principles to the database of the cases in question. 46 We conclude by offering some modest suggestions focusing
on how we can finally, some seventeen years after one of us used
this phrase in a title of another law review article about Atkins,
"giv[e] life" to this case. 47
Our title comes, in part, from Bob Dylan's song License to
Kill,48 which is about corruption and "the havoc man wreaks upon
himself." 49 Through its interpretation of Atkins cases, the Fifth Circuit has "wreak[ed] havoc" on both the litigants before it and the
legal system itself. In an earlier article, one of the co-authors (Michael L. Perlin) discussed the malevolent use of "ethnic adjustments" to improperly-and corruptly-make certain defendants
with intellectual disabilities inappropriately eligible for the death

42.

See infra text accompanying notes 226-39; see also infra notes 206, 210.

43.

See infra Part II.

44.

See infra Part III. It is important to note that, in nearly a majority of those cases in

which there was some initial relief offered by the Fifth Circuit, it appeared that the state
argued that the defendant was malingering intellectual disability (something that virtually
every expert in the world tells us is impossible to accurately do). See infra notes 153-55 and

accompanying text.
45. See infra Section W.A.
46. See Section IV.B.
47.

See Perlin, Life Is in Mirrors, supra note 18; see also, infra Part V.

48.

Bob Dylan,

License to Kill, SONY Music

ENT.

(2018),

https://www.bob-

dylan.com/songs/license-kill. One of the co-authors has relied on another lyric from this
song once previously. See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with GreatSkill:

How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L.
REV. 885, 888 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin, NeuroimagingTestimony].
49.

OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA

376-77 (2004).
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penalty.50 This entire database of cases, and the decision-making of
the Fifth Circuit, is a reflection of such corruption.
II.

THE CASE LAW

The significance of Atkins is crystal-clear from Justice Stevens' opening paragraph:
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried
and punished when they commit crimes. Because of
their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of their impulses, however, they do not act with
the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most
serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendants.5 1
Presumably for these reasons, in the thirteen years since the
Supreme Court decided Peny v. Lynaugh,52 the American public,
legislators, scholars, and judges have deliberated the question
whether the death penalty should ever be imposed on an intellectually disabled criminal. The consensus reflected in those deliberations informs our answer to the question presented by this case:
whether such executions are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 53
In the penalty phase of Atkins' capital murder trial, the defense called a forensic psychologist who had testified that Atkins
was, per the language used at that time, "mildly mentally

50.

See, e.g., Perlin, Corrupt Ways, supra note 13, at 1440 (discussing how the use of

"ethnic adjustments ...

51.
52.

endors[es] and sanction [s] the use of this 'corrupt science"').

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333-34 (dismissing Penry's argument that

there was an "emerging national consensus" against execution of persons with retardation,
noting that only one state had legislatively banned such executions and rejected Penry's
evidence on this point of public opinion surveys as an "insufficient basis" upon which to
ground an Eighth Amendment prohibition); see Perlin, Corrupt Ways, supra note 13, at 1448

n.58.
53.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07.
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retarded."5 4 After Atkins' death sentence was set aside (for reasons
unrelated to the subject of this article), the same witness testified at
the rehearing. 55 The state's rebuttal witness testified, however, that
the defendant was not intellectually disabled, that he was "of average intelligence, at least[,]" and that his appropriate diagnosis was
antisocial personality disorder.5 6 The jury resentenced Atkins to
death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, over a dissent that
characterized the state's expert's testimony as "incredulous as a matter of law," and argued that the imposition of the death sentence
on one "with the mental age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12
[was] excessive.""
The Supreme Court underscored that the "clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." 8 It stressed, on this
point, the significant changes in the thirteen years since its Penrny
decision, during which time, at least sixteen states (and the federal
government) had enacted laws banning such executions.5 9 This
about-face provided "powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal," 60 a finding leading it to conclude that "it is fair
to say that a national consensus has developed against it.1"61
It is especially important that the Court, given its subsequent
decisions in Hall and the two opinions in Moore, added that a determination as to whether Atkins applies involves a finding more

54. Id. at 308. Atkins's IQ was 59. Id. at 309. See generally Mark E. Olive, The DarylAtkins
Story, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 363, 368-74 (2014) (discussing Atkins and the rule of the
important "players").
55. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338.
56. Id. at 309 (testimony of Dr. Stanton Samenow). In other contexts, Dr. Samenow
has publicly stated that "criminals are a 'different breed of person,' who seek to manipulate
the system for their own ends." See Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 410-11 n.1 (4th Cir.
1999) (Murnaghan, J., concurring) (citing, in part, trial transcript); Paul C. Giannelli, Ake

v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert,Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1305, 1415 (2004). Dr. Samenow "has abandoned sociologic, psychologic, and mental
illness explanations for criminal behavior and holds the view that 'most diagnoses of mental
illness [in criminals] resulted from the criminal's fabrications."' Id.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 323-24 (Va. 2000).
Atkins, 536 U.S at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
Id. at 313-15; see also Ellis, supra note 5, at 175-76.
Atkins, 536 U.S at 316.

61.

Id. at 315-16. The court added that this consensus "unquestionably reflects wide-

spread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served by the death

penalty." Id. at 317.
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nuanced than simply a recitation of IQ scores: intellectual disability
involved "not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, selfcare, and self-direction that became manifest before age eighteen."6
The Court concluded that this cohort of defendants should
be "categorically excluded from execution." 63 The retribution and
deterrence rationales that underlay the decision sanctioning the
death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia4 did not apply to intellectually disabled offenders; 65 such application would be nothing more than
"the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,"
and hence an unconstitutional punishment. 66 The Court also rejected both retribution and deterrence rationales for allowing such
executions.67
The Court concluded that there was an "enhanced" risk of
an improperly-imposed death penalty in cases involving defendants
with an intellectual disability because of the possibility of false confessions, as well as "the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants
to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors." 68

62. Id. at 318. Writing after the Court's subsequent decision in Moore v. Texas (Moore
II), requiring a far broader picture of the defendant's mental capabilities to be painted than
was typically done in the pre-Atkins years, Professors Alexander H. Updegrove and Michael
S. Vaughn stressed: "Although it is difficult to find these sources, it is preferable to conduct
interviews with people who have had long-term interactions with the defendant during different developmental stages, including family members, teachers, neighbors, acquaintances, employers, and religious counselors." EvaluatingIntellectual Disability after the Moore
v. Texas Redux, 47J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 486, 493 (2019).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Atkins, 536 U.S at 318.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20.
Id. at 318-19 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).

67.

On retribution: "if the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify

the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution." Id. at 319. On deterrence:
"capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation," and a "cold calculus" that was at the opposite end of the spectrum
from behavior of offenders with an intellectual disability. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting

Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799).
68.

Id. at 320. The Court also stressed several additional interrelated issues: the diffi-

culties that persons with an intellectual disability may have in being able to give meaningful
assistance to their counsel, their status as "typically poor witnesses," and the ways that their
demeanor "may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes." Id.
at 320-21. See generally Judith M. Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States Are
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The Court expressed concern that "reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may
enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury,"69 raising the specter that
"mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk
of wrongful execution."7 This reality led the Court to conclude that
such was "excessive" and thus barred by the Constitution.7 1
There were two dissents, by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.7 2 Importantly, for the purposes of this paper, Justice
Scalia expressed his "fear of faking" 73:
One need only read the definitions of mental retardation adopted by the American Association of Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association to realize that the symptoms of this condition can readily be
feigned. And ... the capital defendant who feigns mental
retardation risks nothing at all. 74

CircumventingBoth the Letter and the Spirit of the Court's Mandate, 13 BERKELEYJ. CRIM. L. 215,
222-26 (2008) (discussing this aspect of Atkins).
69. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989)).
70. Id. at 321. On wrongful convictions in general, see Talia Harmon et al., Post-Furman
Death Row Exonerations and Publicity in the News, 52 CRIM. L. BULL., Art. 3 (2016).

71.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.

72.

The ChiefJustice (joined byJustice Thomas andJustice Scalia) criticized that part

of the majority's methodology that had relied upon public opinion polls, the views of professional and religious organizations, and the status of the death penalty in other nations as
part of the basis for its decision. Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also
dissented (joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Thomas) flatly rejecting the notion
that there was a "consensus" against the execution of persons with mild mental retardation.

Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 353-54.
74.

Id. at 353. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You

from

Me": The Insanity Defense, the AuthoritarianSpirit, the Fearof Faking and the Culture of Punish-

ment, 82 IowA L. REv. 1375, 1408-16 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Borderline].On how Scalia's
opinion is a "pathetic recapitulation of [a] dreary myth," see Perlin, Life Is in Mirrors, supra
note 18, at 344 (as discussed in Michael L. Perlin, "Simplify You, Classify You ": Stigma, Stereo-

types and Civil Rights in Disability ClassificationSystems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 607, 635 n.123
(2009) [hereinafter Perlin, Simplify]). A more-recent exhaustive empirical analysis has
found this fear "unfounded." SeeJohn H. Blume, Sheri LynnJohnson & Katherine E. Ensler,

Killing the Oblivious:An EmpiricalStudy of Competency to be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L. REv.
335, 354 (2014); John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual
Disability and CapitalPunishment Twelve Years after The Supreme Court's Creationof a Categorical

Bar, 23 WM. & MARYBILL RTs.J. 393, 396-98 (2014) (same) [hereinafter Blume et al., A Tale
of Two Atkins]; see also infra notes 145-50.
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"Nothing has changed," he concluded, in the nearly 300
years since Hale wrote his Pleas of the Crown:
[Determination of a person's incapacity] is a matter of
great difficulty, partly from the easiness of counterfeiting
this disability . . . and partly from the variety of the degrees of this infirmity, whereof some are sufficient, and
some are insufficient to excuse persons in capital offenses.75
Atkins was first clarified, modified, and expanded upon in
Hall v. Florida,76 which made clear that inquiries into defendants'
intellectual disabilities for the purpose of determining whether they
are potentially subject to the death penalty cannot be limited to a
bare numerical "reading" of an IQ score. 77 Under Florida law, if a
defendant's IQ was seventy or below, he was deemed to be intellectually disabled; if, however, his IQ measured at seventy-one or
above, all further inquiries into intellectual disability 78-on the
question of the application of Atkins-were barred. 79 Hall declared
this rule unconstitutional for creating an "unacceptable risk" that
persons with intellectual disabilities would be executed. 80
In his majority opinion in Hall, Justice Kennedy reiterated a
major point of Atkins:8 1 that this population in question faced "a
75. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 354 (quoting 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32-33 (1736))
(Justice Scalia cited no source more recent than this pre-Revolutionary War Treatise).

76. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). See generallyJames Ellis, Hall v. Florida: The
Supreme Court's Guidance in Implementing Atkins, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 383 (2014);
Blume et al., An EmpiricalLook, supra note 36.
77.

Hall, 134 S Ct. at 1995. Prior to the decision in Hall, the Fifth Circuit ordered

Atkins to be applied retroactively. See Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2002). On the
other hand, that court declined to apply Hall retroactively, while pointing out that Hall
dealt with "a formulaic IQ standard that had been used by the state of Florida but never in

Texas[.]" Weathers v. Davis, 915 F.3d 1025, 1028 (5th Cir. 2019).
78. On this issue and the implications of changes in the American Psychiatric Association's then-recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5), see, e.g., Jill V.
Feluren, Moving the Focus Away From the IQ Score Towards the Subjective Assessment of Adaptive

Functioning: The Efect of The DSM-5 on the Post-Atkins CategoricalExemption of Oftenders with
IntellectualDisabilityfrom the Death Penalty, 38 NOVA L. REv. 323 (2014); Kate Janse van Resnburg, The DSM-5 and Its PotentialEf]ects on Atkins v. Virginia, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y
61 (2013); Octavia Gory, Safeguardingthe ConstitutionalRights of the Intellectually Disabled:Requiring Courts to Apply Criteria That Do Not Deviate from the Current Edition of the DSM, 24

WIDENER L. REV. 155 (2018).
79. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
80. Id. at 1990.
81. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
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special risk of wrongful execution" because "they are more likely to
give false confessions, are often poor witnesses, and are less able to
give meaningful assistance to their counsel."8 2 This led to a specific
question before the Court: how was intellectual disability to be defined for purposes of executability? 83
Justice Kennedy turned to the "medical community's opinions" on this issue, 84 noting that that community defined intellectual disability according to three criteria: "significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning (the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances), and onset of these deficits during the developmental period."85 The first two of these criteria were central, he said, as they
had "long been" the defining characteristic of intellectual disabil-

ity. 86
State law thus forbade Florida sentencing courts from considering "even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual disability as measured and made manifest by the defendant's failure or
inability to adapt to his social and cultural environment, including
medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and reports, and
testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances, "87 notwithstanding the fact that the medical community accepts all of this
evidence as probative of intellectual disability, whether or not an
individual's score is over or below seventy IQ points. 88
Florida law contradicted all professional judgment. "The professionals who design, administer, and interpret IQ tests have
agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should be read not as a
single fixed number but as a range." 89 The Court stressed: "An

82.

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993 (quoting, in part, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21).

83.

In ruling that Hall had no impact on Texas's use of the Briseno factors (later dis-

credited in Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (MoorelI)), the Fifth Circuit further noted
that, "Texas has never adopted the bright-line cutoff at issue in Hall." Mays v. Stephens, 757
F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2014). Although that is true, there is much more in Hallthan merely
a repudiation of a bright-line standard. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.

84.
85.

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993.
Id. at 1994 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; Brief for American Psychological

Association et al. as Amici CuriaeSupporting Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533

U.S 975
86.
87.
88.

(2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL 648606 at 12-13 [hereinafterAPA Brief]).
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (quoting APA Brief, supra note 85, at 11).
Id.
Id. (citing APA Brief, supra note 85, at 15).
89. Id. at 1995; see Courtney Johnson, "Moore" Than Just a Number: Why IQ Cutofps Are
an UnconstitutionalMeasure fr DeterminingIntellectual Disability, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 791
(2018) ("The term 'intellectual disability' does not refer to a single disorder or disease, but
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individual's intellectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single
numerical score."90 It was thus error to use such a test score "without
necessary adjustment."91 As the "vast majority" of states had rejected
a strict seventy point cutoff, and as the trend to recognize the significance of the standard error of measurement was "consisten [t],"
this was, to the Court, "strong evidence of consensus that our society
does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane."9 2
The Court also stressed that neither Florida nor its supporting amici could point to "a single medical professional who supports
this cutoff," and that the state's rule went against "unanimous professional consensus." 93 Intellectual disability, Justice Kennedy underscored, "is a condition, not a number." 94 He concluded:
The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may
impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must
have a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution. Florida's law contravenes our Nation's commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world. The States
are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the Constitution
protects. 95
In his dissent, Justice Alito disagreed, arguing that the positions of professional associations "at best, represent the views of a

rather to a heterogeneous set of disabilities that affect the level of a person's functioning in

defined domains." (quoting Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 230 (Tenn. 2011))).
90. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1995 (emphasis added). Also, the Court added, "because the test
itself may be flawed, or administered in a consistently flawed manner, multiple examinations may result in repeated similar scores, so that even a consistent score is not conclusive
evidence of intellectual functioning." Id. at 1995-96.

91.

Id. at 1996.

92. Id. at 1998. The Court also considered post-Atkins legislative developments, concluding that "every state legislature to have considered the issue after Atkins-save Virginia's- . . . whose law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to

that of Florida." Id.
93. Id. at 2000 (quoting in part APA Brief, supra note 85, at 15 (emphasis added)).
94. Id. at 2001.
95.

Id. An important commentary on Hall has underscored: "Disproportionate reli-

ance on IQ cutoffs not only fails to capture an individual's adaptive functioning and various
sources of test error, but also ignores the necessity of comprehensive neuropsychological
testing in assessing a defendant's potential for rehabilitation." Brian K. Cooke, Dominque

Delalot & Tonia L. Werner, Hall v. Florida: Capital Punishment, IQ, and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities,43J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 230, 234 (2015).
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small professional elite,"9 6 concluding that Florida's standard was
"sensible," comporting with the "longstanding belief that IQ tests
are the best measure of intellectual functioning." 97
The Court returned to this issue soon after its decision in
Hall, holding in Brumfield v. Cain that a state court's postconviction
determination that prisoner's IQ score of seventy-five demonstrated
that he could not possess subaverage intelligence reflected an unreasonable determination of the facts. 98 Then, it held in Moore v.
Texas (Moore 1),99 that state rules-based on superseded medical
standards 1 0 -created an unacceptable risk that a person with intellectual disabilities could be executed in violation of the Eighth

96.

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2005 (emphasis added).

97.

Id. at 2007. Justice Alito cited no source to support the adjective "longstanding."

Id. The ChiefJusticeJustice Scalia andJustice Thomasjoined in this dissent. Id. (Rehnquist,

C.J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015). The Brumfield court acknowledged that "[I]ntellectually
disabled persons may have 'strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths in some
adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise
show an overall limitation."' Id. at 2281. Brumfield also held that a defendant needs "only to
raise a 'reasonable doubt' as to his intellectual disability to be entitled to an evidentiary

hearing." Id.; see also People v. Woodruff, 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (2018) (hearing that defendant received after guilty verdict for capital murder to determine whether he was intellectually disabled under Atkins did not deny his constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection of the law, where jury trial devised by trial court was essentially identical
to procedures stated in Atkins and statute governing hearings to determine intellectual disabilities). Brumfield is the only Fifth Circuit case that the Supreme Court has decided on this

question.
99. MooreI, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
100. In Ex parte Briseno, Texas adhered to a standard that included seven evidentiary
factors that it articulated without any citation "to any authority, medical or judicial." Moore

I, 137 S. Ct. at 1046 (citing 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2004)). These seven "Briseno
factors" are:
" Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage-his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was mentally retarded at that time,
and, if so, act in accordance with that determination?
" Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive?
" Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?
" Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of
whether it is socially acceptable?
" Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or
do his responses wander from subject to subject?
" Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests?
" Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did
the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution

of purpose?
Moore , 137 S. Ct. at 1046 n.6, (citing Briseno, 135 S.W.3d, at 8-9).
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Amendment.1 1 In vacating the Texas state opinion, the Supreme
Court rearticulated its finding in Hall that "adjudications of intellectual disability should be "informed by the views of medical experts,"1 0 2 and that the Briseno standards was "an invention ... untied
to any acknowledged source."103 After quoting its language in Hall
that "[t]he Eighth Amendment is not fastened to the obsolete," 104
the Court in Moore I noted "Hall indicated that being informed by
the medical community does not demand adherence to everything
stated in the latest medical guide. But neither does our precedent
license disregard of current medical standards." 5
The state court erred, the Supreme Court concluded, by
mistakenly "over-emphasiz [ing the defendant's] perceived adaptive
strengths," rather than focusing on his "adaptive deficits."1 0 6 Further the lower court's "attachment" to the Briseno factors "further
impeded its assessment of Moore's adaptive functioning" as they
"advanced lay perceptions of intellectual disabilities," noting that
the medical profession "has endeavored to counter [such] lay stereotypes."107 Although the Texas court had said it would abandon
reliance on the Briseno evidentiary factors," 108 the Supreme Court
concluded that "it seems to have used many of those factors in
reaching its conclusion."1 09 The state court continued, in spite of
the Court's admonition in Moore I, to rely on "lay stereotypes of the
intellectually disabled."11 0
Some important strains emerge from the post-Atkins opinions in Hall and Moore. The focus on dignity in Hall-mentioned at

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1044.
Id. (quoting Hall, 135 S. Ct. at 2000).
Id., discussing Ex parteBriseno, 135 S.W. 3d 1 (Tex, Crim. Ct, App. 2004).
Moore j, 137 S. Ct. at 1048 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992).
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1051.
Ex parteMoore, 548 S.W. 2d at 560, rev'd & remanded, Moorelj, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019).
Moorelj, 139 S. Ct. at 671.

110.

MooreI, 137 S. Ct. at 1052. By way of example, in rejecting the intellectual disability

claim, the Texas court had stressed that Moore "hada girlfriend" and ajob. Ex parteMoore,
548 S.W.2d at 570-71, rev'd 139 S. Ct. at 672. The Supreme Court contrasted these stereotypes with legal criteria articulated by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, criticizing the "incorrect stereotypes" that persons with intellectual
disability "never have friends,jobs, spouses, or children." Moorelj, 139 S. Ct. at 672 (quoting
Robert L. Schlalock et al., INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 151 (Am. Ass'n on Intell. and Developmental Disabilities ed., 11th

ed. 2010)).
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least eight times in the course of the majority opinion-is of major
significance." This development followed up the Supreme Court's
focus on dignitarian values expressed in Atkins, in which the Court
cited Trop v. Dulles"' for the proposition that "the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man .... The Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. "113 The Court's strong focus in Hallunderscores its commitment to these principles."4
Moore is significant for multiple reasons. First, as it follows on
the (more distant) heels of Atkins, and the (more recent) heels of
Hall and Brumfield, it makes clear that the Supreme Court takes very
seriously the potential peril of subjecting a person with intellectual
disability to execution." 5 Second, it reaffirms the Court's embrace
of the most up-to-date professional standards in support of its constitutional discourse.11 6 Third, its focus on the way the Brisenofactors

111.

See generally Kevin Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV.

383 (2017). Professor Carol Sanger has suggested that dignity means that people "possess
an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and respected," and that they should not be
subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent with their intrinsic worth. Carol
Sanger, DecisionalDignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM.
& L. 409, 415 (2009). Treating people with dignity and respect makes them more
likely to view procedures as fair and the motives behind law enforcement's actions as wellmeaning. Tamara Birckhead, Toward a Theory of ProceduralJusticefar Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L.

J. GENDER

REV. 1447, 1474 (2009). A notion of individual dignity-generally articulated through concepts of autonomy, respect, equality, and freedom from undue government interferencewas at the heart of ajurisprudential and moral outlook that resulted in the reform, not only
of criminal procedure, but of the various institutions more or less directly linked with the
criminal justice system, including juvenile courts, prisons, and mental institutions. Heather
Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, PromotingDignity and Preventing Shame and Humiliation by

Improving the Quality and Education of Attorneys in Sexually Violent Predator(SVP) Civil Commitment Cases, 28 U. FLA.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 291, 301-02 (2017). On the relationship between
dignity and therapeutic jurisprudence, see infra text accompanying notes 288-94.

112.
113.

356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12.

114.

It is important to consider Justice Alito's curious dissent in Hall. His faux populist

charge that the professional associations relied upon by the majority reflect nothing but a

"small, professional elite," Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2005 (1986) (Alito,J., dissenting),
flies in the face of reality. At this point in time, there is not a shred of expert support that
suggests that a strict numerical cutoff can or should be the "be all and end all" of assessing
intellectual disability. Yet, he adheres to his rejection of allprofessional opinion (supported
by all the valid and reliable research). Id.
115. See Austin Holler, Moore v. Texas and the Ongoing National Consensus Struggle Between the Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and the Definition ofIntellectualDisability,50 Loy.

U. CHI. L.J. 415, 434 (2018).
116. Id. at 438.
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"advanced lay perceptions of intellectual disabilities" and how the
medical profession "has endeavored to counter [such] lay stereotypes,""7 tells us that the Court truly does take these issues seriously.118 As we note below, twenty-one failures in the Fifth Circuit
are the direct result of that court's use of the since-discredited
Briseno factors.1 1 9
Importantly for the purposes of this paper, Moore was relied
upon by the Supreme Court in remands of four cases to the Fifth
Circuit. 120 Of these four, one resulted in actual relief,12 1 two are still
being litigated,12 2 and one resulted in an execution. 123
III.

THE DATA AND WHAT IT TELLS

US

A. Research Methodology
In order to conduct the necessary data analysis, the authors
searched Fifth Circuit cases invoking Atkins claims on both the LexisNexis and Westlaw databases. First, we conducted a general search
of Atkins claims on both databases. Of these, only cases in which
defendants relied upon Atkins for the purpose of seeking reversal
or vacation of their death sentence due to an intellectual disability
were included in the analysis. Likewise, cases that sought to expand
Atkins to cover conditions other than intellectual disability, such as

117.

Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1052; Moore II, 139 S. Ct. at 672.

118.

See PERLIN

&

CUCOLO, supra note 16, at

§

17-4.2.4: "The Court (implicitly, to be

sure) acknowledged how sanism-based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged 'ordinary common sense' (OCS)-permeates the death penalty fact-finding process." On sanism
in general, see supra note 8. On false "ordinary common sense" in general, see infa note 198.
119.

See supra note 100.

120. See Henderson v. Davis, 868 F.3d 314, 315 (5th Cir. 2017); Long v. Davis, 706 F.
App'x 181, 181 (5th Cir. 2017); Weathers v. Davis, 915 F.3d 1025, 1026 (5th Cir. 2019);
Martinez v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 1432, 1433 (2017).
121. Henderson v. Davis, 868 F.3d 314, 315 (5th Cir. 2017). For earlier decisions, see In
re Henderson, 462 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2006); Henderson v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 773, 781
(5th Cir. 2010); see also Henderson v. Stephens, 791 F.3d 567, 586 (5th Cir. 2015).
122. Long v. Davis, 706 F. App'x 181 (5th Cir. 2017); Weathers v. Davis, 659 F. App'x
778 (5th Cir. 2016).
123. Martinez v. Davis, 653 F. App'x 308, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2016).
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fetal alcohol syndrome, 2 brain damage,125 or mental illness,126
were also included in the collective analysis. Cases that raised Penry
mitigation-based claims, competency claims, non-capital cases, and
cases that only referred to Atkins to discuss rules for raising retroactive claims were omitted.12 7
Through this process, seventy defendants' cases were determined to involve Atkins claims. Inspired by the previously referenced Atkins "pressure points," 128 a coding sheet made up of twenty
variables was created (Appendix A). Each case was coded to determine which variables were present or absent. After reading through
each case, it was possible to code the variables, and data was entered
to develop frequency tables to determine the prevalence of these
variables among the Atkins claims. An exploratory analysis was conducted to determine whether specific factors were related to successful, unsuccessful, and partially successful cases.
B.

Overview of Findings

When we consider the entire universe of cases in which the
Fifth Circuit has considered Atkins claims, 129 some major findings
emerge.
124.
(5th Cir.
125.
211 (5th

See, e.g., In re Soliz, 938 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2019); Soliz v. Davis, 750 F. App'x 282
2018).
See, e.g., Shore v. Davis, 845 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2017); Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d
Cir. 2014); Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 991 (5th Cir. 2014). For other litigation

in the Tamayo case, see, e.g., Tamayo v. Perry, 553 F. App'x 395 (5th Cir. 2014); In reTamayo,

552 F. App'x 371 (5th Cir. 2014); Tamayo v. Thaler, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26665 (5th Cir.
Dec. 21, 2011); Tamayo v. Thaler, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26671 (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 2011). On
the relationship between intellectual disability and brain injury in this context, see Alison J.
Lynch, Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, My BewilderingBrainToils in Vain": Trau-

matic BrainInjury and The CriminalTrialProcess, 74 RUTGERS L. REV. - (2021) (forthcoming),
draft accessible at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3777551.
126. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Davis, 935 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2019); Rockwell v. Davis, 853 F.3d
758 (5th Cir. 2017); Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2015); Turner v. Epps, 460 F.
App'x 322 (5th Cir. 2012); Ripkowski v. Thaler, 438 F. App'x 296 (5th Cir. 2011); Shisinday
v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Neville, 440 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2006). For
other cases involving defendants with fetal alcohol syndrome or mental illness, see infra note

258.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 717 F. App'x 450 (5th Cir. 2018); Panetti v. Davis,
863 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2017); In re Hunt, 835 F.3d 1277 (5th Cir. 2016); In re Williams, 806
F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015); Vasquez v. Thaler, 389 F. App'x 419 (5th Cir. 2010); Adams v.
Quarterman, 324 F. App'x 340 (5th Cir. 2009).
128.

16, at

See Perlin, Lie Is in Mirrors, supra note 18, at 331-32; PERLIN

& CUCOLO,

supra note

§ 17-4.2.2.

129.
ysis.

See supra Section III.A for a description of the methodology employed in this anal-
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As we noted above, there was actual relief granted in only
nine (12.9%) of the cases, 130 and eight cases (11.5%) are still pending. 131 In short, in only seventeen (24%) of the cases did Atkins

130. See Henderson v. Davis, 868 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2017); Martinez v. Davis, 653 F.
App'x 308 (5th Cir. 2016); Brumfield v. Cain, 808 F.3d 1041 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Campbell,
750 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2014); Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2010); Wiley v. Epps,
625 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2010); Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F. App'x 65 (5th Cir. 2009);
Thomas v. Quarterman, 335 F. App'x 386 (5th Cir. 2009); Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330
(5th Cir. 2002). It is difficult to characterize Martinez and Wiley as "successes," as Martinez
died in prison and Wiley died on death row. Campbell's case was ultimately resolved in
federal court without an evidentiary hearing. The Attorney General hired an expert to review the extensive documentary evidence concerning Campbell's background, and apparently advised counsel that the defendant was likely to prevail on his Atkins claim; the state
thus agreed to a stipulated order finding that the defendant had an intellectual disability.

See Campbell v. Davis, Civ. No. 4:00-cv-03844 (S.D. Tex., May 10, 2019) (Joint Advisory Concerning Campbell's Intellectual Disability Claim on file with authors).
Campbell was subsequently re-sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He
was reviewed in early 2018 for possible release on parole, and parole was officially denied
on March 2, 2018, and was given a seven-year "set-off," meaning that his next parole review
was scheduled for February 2025. See ParoleReview Information, TEX. DEP'T OF CRIM.JUST.,
https://offender.tdcj .texas.gov/OffenderSearch/reviewDetail.action?sid=04286378

&tdcj=02141630&fullName=CAMPBELL%2CROBERT+JAMES.

His counsel believes the

likelihood that Campbell will ever be released on parole is "very small." E-mail from Robert
Owen, Campbell's appellate counsel, to the authors (June 8, 2020, 11:20 AM) (on file with
authors).

131. See Sorto v. Davis, 716 F. App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2018); In re Cathey, 857 F.3d 221 (5th
Cir. 2017); Long v. Davis, 706 F. App'x 181 (5th Cir. 2017); Weathers v. Davis, 659 F. App'x
778 (5th Cir. 2016); Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Chase, 804
F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2015); Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007); In reJohnson,
334 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2003).
After the Fifth Circuit entered a stay of execution and authorized the successor petition,
Johnson's case was remanded to the district court. His counsel filed a new habeas petition
raising the Atkins claim, asking for a new hearing, and arguing that the defendant's intellectual disability is relevant to tolling (on the question of his diligence in pursuing his

rights). SeeJohnson v. Davis, Civ. No. 4:19-CV-03047 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 12, 2019) (Amended
Second or Successive Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus on file with authors). His lawyer
believes the odds are "pretty good" that such a hearing will be scheduled. E-mail fromJessica
Graf, Johnson's appellate counsel, to the authors (June 8, 2020, 12:44 PM) (on file with
authors). Long recently had a state habeas evidentiary hearing; there has been no decision
as of yet. E-mail from Scott Smith, Moore's appellate counsel, to the authors (June 8, 2020,
03:50 PM) (on file with authors). Counsel notes that Long's last four IQ tests were scored
at 62, 63, 64 and 63, an "amazing consistency." Id. Appellate counsel has had no contact
with Moore since that defendant's sentence was commuted. Email from Scott Smith,
Moore's appellate counsel, to the authors (June 8, 2020) (on file with authors). See Moore

v. Dretke, No. Civ.A. 603CV224, 2005 U.S. Dist. WL 1606437 (E.D. Tex.July 1, 2005). Pierce
is currently serving a life sentence, his death sentence having been vacated after a determination of a Strickland v. Washington violation, see Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7, at
296; see also E-mail from David Dow, Pierce's appellate counsel, to the authors (June 8, 2020,

11:19 AM) (on file with authors).
The post-litigation history of the Rivera case is the most complex of any in this cohort. The
district court agreed to abate the case so that counsel could seek a commutation of the
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matter at all to the defendants in question. 132 And, importantly, in
thirteen cases (nearly 18.5%), in which some preliminary relief had
been granted, defendants were nonetheless executed or are awaiting execution. 133 In the context of the universe of "total failures,"
two factors stand out: of the forty "total failures," twenty-one turned,
at least in significant part, on the Fifth Circuit's use of the subsequently-discredited Briseno factors,134 and in the twenty-two cases in

defendant's sentence. Counsel filed a request with the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles,
and that board unanimously agreed that defendant's sentence should be commuted to life
without parole based on his intellectual disability. Counsel asked Governor Rick Perry to
commute his sentence (as part of the commutation process in Texas, the Governor must
agree to commutation). Over a six-year period, this was never acted upon by then-Governor
Perry. Although the trial judge administratively abated the case in 2014, since Governor
Abbott took office in 2015, the defendant has remained on death row (but without an execution date since 2003). The districtjudge recently issued an Order on May 11, 2020 asking
whether we should go forward with a hearing on equitable tolling. Counsel then (1) sent a
letter to Governor Abbott on May 23, 2020, asking to have Mr. Rivera's sentence commuted
to life without parole, and (2) filed a Joint Advisory with the district court, informing the
court of these proceedings, and asking the court to give the Governor time to act. In light
of the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex Parte Moore, 587 S.W.3d 787
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2019), counsel remains "hopeful" that Governor Abbott will commute
Rivera's sentence. E-mail from Cathy Smith, Rivera's appellate counsel, to the authors (June

8, 2020, 05:21 PM) (on file with authors).
In the Sorto case, counsel has obtained funding to do additional testing on the question of
intellectual disability. Email from David Dow, Pierce's appellate counsel, to the authors

(June 8, 2020, 11:19 AM) (on file with authors).
In Weathers, counsel is working on a state successor petition, following remand from Supreme Court on basis of that Court's decisions in Moore v. Texas. E-mail from John "Bud"
Ritenour, Weathers' current counsel, to the authors (July 13, 2013, 10:13 PM) (on file with
authors).
132.

In addition to cases discussed on the merits elsewhere in this paper, see, e.g., Hearn

v. Thaler, 669 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2012) (relying on Briseno); Ladd v. Stephens, 748 F.3d 637
(5th Cir. 2014) (same); Lewis v. Thaler, 701 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2012) (same); Wilson v.
Thaler, 450 F. App'x 369 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580 (5th
Cir. 2007) (same); Rosales v. Quarterman, 291 F. App'x 558, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2008) (Atkinsbased COA granted out of "abundance of caution"; subsequently dismissed as defendant
did not submit sufficient evidence to court). This entire cohort of cases reflect cases that
appeared first to be "partial successes," but eventually were failures.

133. See infta Appendix B.
134.SeeMoorej, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044-46 (2017). On retroactivity, in the Sixth Circuit, see
Hill v. Anderson, 881 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2018), vacated by Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504
(2019) (Moore is not to be applied retroactively). See also Smith v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't

of Corr., 924 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2020 WL 3578738 (2020) (ruling that
the constitutional law announced in Moore v. Texas that states could not disregard current
clinical and medical standards in assessing whether capital defendant was intellectually
disabled did not apply retroactively). The twenty-one cases were: Henderson, 868 F. 3d at

314, vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1450 (2017); Eldridge v. Davis, 661 F. App'x 253 (5th Cir. 2016);
Segundo v. Davis, 831 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2016); Guevara v. Stephens, 577 F. App'x 364
(5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 986 (2019), with further proceedings in Guevara v.
Davis, 679 F. App'x 332 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 554 (2019); Garcia v.
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which claims under Strickland v. Washingtonwere raised, there were
partial successes in only three. 13
When looking more closely at the universe of ostensible
"successes," important findings emerge. If a defense expert had adequately explained why malingering could be ruled out, if an expert
who explained the significance of the Flynn Effect, or if the WAIS
III and WAIS-R tests were used in evaluating the defendant, it is
more likely that there would be "success" at the Fifth Circuit level. 136
On the other hand, if the WISC test were used, or if defense counsel
failed to introduce expert testimony to rebut the notion that the
defendant malingered on IQ tests, it was less likely that there would
be "success" at the Fifth Circuit level (or at the district court
level).137
Next, we discuss the key variable factors-malingering, the
Flynn Effect and the various IQ tests-and then consider that small
universe of cases in which defense counsel dealt with each of these
effectively, a strategy leading in some cases to actual relief.

Stephens, 757 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2014); Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2014);
Williams v. Stephens, 761 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 2014); Harris v. Thaler, 464 F. App'x 301 (5th
Cir. 2012); Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2011); Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340
(5th Cir. 2011); Hines v. Thaler, 456 F. App'x 357 (5th Cir. 2011); Esparza v. Thaler, 408
F. App'x 787 (5th Cir. 2010); Moore v. Quarterman, 517 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2008); Perkins
v. Quarterman, 254 F. App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Quarterman, 498 F.3d 306 (5th
Cir 2007); Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392
(5th Cir. 2006); In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2006); Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d
158 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2005).
135. See Busby v. Davis, 925 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2019); Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x
641 (5th Cir. 2015); Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2010).
136.

Defense counsel was "successful" in four of nine (44.4%) cases in which she or he

presented rebuttal to state-introduced evidence of "malingering," in five of the nine cases
(55.5%) in which s/he presented evidence on the Flynn Effect and in eight of nine (88.9%)
in which s/he presented evidence that the WAIS IQ test was used. See Appendix B, where
"successful" is used to denote cases in which actual relief was granted or ordered.
137.

Thus, where Strickland v. Washington claims were raised, defendants were success-

ful only in two of twenty cases, or nine percent. See infra note 266. On the Fifth Circuit and
Strickland claims in general, see Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7. In cases in which the
WISC IQ test, rather than the WAIS IQ test, was used, defendants have thus far been successful in none of the thirteen cases. See infra note 169. There is one case in this category in
which litigation is still ongoing in which the defendant remains potentially successful. See

Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641 (5th Cir. 2015), discussed in Appendix C. On the other
hand, where the WAIS test was used, defendants were successful in thirteen out of thirtynine-thirty-three percent of cases. See Appendix B.
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On Malingering

It is important to first consider how allegations of malingering are construed. 138 In spite of the unanimity of the valid and reliable evidence that malingering is (1) ultra-rare in cases involving
intellectual disability, and (2) easy to detect, 139 allegations of malingering persist in the data base of the cases we have studied. The
Fifth Circuit has-perhaps with "willful blindness" 14 0-accepted
these allegations,14 1 in almost all cases (except, as we have noted,
where it is rebutted by expert testimony), and that rebuttal is combined with discussion of the Flynn Effect and the use of the WAIS
IQ test. 1 2 As noted above, in his Atkins dissent,Justice Scalia warned
that "the symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned ... [and
that] the capital defendant who feigns mental retardation risks

§ 2-3.3.1,

138.

See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16,

139.

See, e.g., RICHARD ROGERS, R. MICHAEL BAGBY & S.E. DICKENS, SIRS: STRUCTURED

at 2-29 to 2-31.

INTERVIEW OFREPORTED SYMPTOMS: PROFESSIONAL MANUAL (1992); see also, e.g., Richard Rogers et al., Explanatory Models of Malingering, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 543 (1994); William
Wilkinson, TherapeuticJurisprudence and Workers' Compensation, 30 ARIZ. ATT'Y 28, 29 n.12

(April 1994) (citing Richard Rogers et al., FeigningNeuropsychologicalImpairment: A Critical
Review of Methodological and Clinical Considerations, 13 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 255 (1993));

David R. Katner, RaisingMentalHealth Issues-Otherthan Insanity-inJuvenileDelinquency Defense,
28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, 90 n.101 (2000) (citing inter alia Shayna Gothard et al., Detection of
Malingering in Competency to Stand TrialEvaluations, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493 (1995) (as

cited in Perlin, Simplify, supra note 74, at 635 n.123.)); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths:
The Symbolism Mythology oflnsanityDefenseurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 715-16
nn.556-58 (1989-90).
140. There is "willful blindness" when individuals "deliberately shield ...
themselves
from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances."

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2012).
141. On how courts/decisions do not concern themselves with such underlying issues
in the criminal trial process is a prime example of such willful blindness, see Michael L.
Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625,
658-59 (1993). Further, on how this sort of willful blindness is the result of "courts' succumbing to the vividness heuristic," see Michael L. Perlin, Deborah A. Dorfman & Naomi
M. Weinstein, "On DesolationRow ": The Blurringof the Borders between Civil and CriminalMental

Disability Law, and What It Meansfar All of Us, 24 TEX.J. ON CIV. LIES. & CIV. RTS. 59, 85-86
(2018). The "vividness heuristic" is a cognitive-simplifying device through which a "single
vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be made." Perlin, Borderline, supra note 74, at 1417.

142.

See infra Section II.C.
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nothing at all. 143 This fear, a close relation to the fear of faked insanity defenses, 144 continues to "paralyze the legal system." 145
Strikingly, in a parallel area-that of incompetency to stand
trial cases-courts continue to focus, almost obsessively, on testimony that raises the specter of malingering, 146 notwithstanding
other evidence that such feigning is attempted in less than eight
percent of all such cases. 147 There is no evidence whatsoever that
such feigning "has ever been a remotely significant problem of
criminal procedure," especially in cases of defendants with intellectual disabilities. 148
Importantly, valid and reliable instruments that expose
feigned malingering have been available to researchers for years
and have been written about extensively in articles in databases that
are readily available to Supreme Court justices. 149 As of twenty years
ago, over ninety percent of all subjects were correctly classified as

143. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353. HereJustice Scalia cited merely to Hale's Pleasof the Crown.
Matthew Hale, 1 PLEAS OF THE CROWN 33-34 (1st Am. ed. 1847). As noted above, an earlier
exhaustive empirical analysis has found this fear to be "unfounded." See supra note 74;

Blume et al., An EmpiricalLook, supra note 36, at 639.
144. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Forthe Misdemeanor Outlaw ": The Impact of the ADA on
the Institutionalizationof CriminalDefendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 236
(2000); see also Perlin, Neuroimaging Testimony, supra note 48, at Error! Main Document

Only.907.
145. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 74, at 1423. Again, Professors John Blume and his
colleagues state bluntly-and accurately-"Justice Scalia was wrong." Blume et al., A Tale of
Two Atkins, supra note 74, at 396. The authors note that in calculating the filing rate "in the

manner most generous to Justice Scalia's floodgates concern ...

only approximately 7.7%

of persons whose lives could potentially be spared by a determination of intellectual disability have raised such claims." See id. at 396-98.

146. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 586 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 886
(1992); State v. Sharkey, 821 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
147. Dewey Cornell & Gary Hawk, ClinicalPresentationofMalingerersDiagnosed by Experienced ForensicPsychologists, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 380-83 (1989). On the potential role
of racial bias in such determinations, see id. at 382 (clinicians may over-diagnose malingering in black defendants). See generally Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Tolling/r
the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed": The Marginalizationof Racial Minorities and
Women in InstitutionalMental DisabilityLaw, 20 J. GENDER, RACE &JUST. 431 (2017) [hereinafter Perlin & Cucolo, Tolling];James Hicks, Ethnicity, Race, and ForensicPsychiatry: Are We

Color-Blind?, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 21 (2004).
148. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M.
L. REV. 255, 276 (2003) (concluding that mental retardation (as it was then known) was
"hard to fake successfully, because the criteria require evidence that retardation began during childhood-evidence, that is, that the condition existed years before the defendant committed a capital crime.").
149.

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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either faking or not faking.150 As Professor James Ellis and his colleagues have noted:
Successfully feigning a lower level of intelligence on IQ
tests is more difficult than jurors and, apparently,judges
on the Fifth Circuit, imagine. A major reason is the structure of the tests themselves. "During IQ testing, malingerers will frequently miss 'easy' questions but answer
more difficult questions correctly. Their test results often
show wide 'scatter' and inconsistent responding."15 1

ii.

The Flynn Effect.152

The Flynn Effect refers to a theory in which the intelligence
of a population increases over time, thereby potentially inflating
performance on IQ examinations. 15 3 The accepted increase in scoring is approximately three points per decade or 0.33 points per
year. 154 As many courts have already recognized, Halldoes not mention the Flynn Effect and does not require its application to all IQ
scores in Atkins cases. 155 Although the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities' publication, The Death
Penalty and Intellectual Disability15 6 may now advocate for the

150. David Schretlen & Hal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test Battery to Detect Prison Inmates
Who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAV. SCI. & THE L. 75 (1990).

151.

Ellis, Everington & Delpha, supra note 14, at 1370 n.261 (quoting, in part, Philip

J. Resnick & Michael

R. Harris, Retrospective Assessment of Malingeringin Insanity Defense Cases,
in RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF MENTAL STATES IN LITIGATION: PREDICTING THE PAST

101, 126 (Robert I. Simon & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 2002)).
152. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 17-4.2.2. n.688.01, at 17-104.
153. Quince v. State, 241 So.3d 58, 60 n.2 (Fla. 2018).
154.

See id.; see, e.g., James R. Flynn, Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations: What IQ Tests Really

Measure, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 171, 172-77 (1987) (discussing the implications of the Flynn
Effect, which refers to observed gains in IQ scores over time); Young, supra note 26 (discussing the determinations of intellectual disability in death penalty cases).

155.

Se, e.g., Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734, 746 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that Hall

does not even mention the Flynn effect and does not require that IQ scores be adjusted for

it), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2603 (2018); Smith v. Duckworth, 824 F.3d 1233, 1246 (10th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1333 (2017) ("Hallsays nothing about application of the Flynn
Effect to IQ scores in evaluating a defendant's intellectual disability"); Ledford v. Warden,

Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 639 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 1432 (2017) ("Hall did not mention the Flynn effect.... There is no 'established
medical practice' of reducing IQ scores pursuant to the Flynn effect. The Flynn effect remains disputed by medical experts, which renders the rationale of Hallwholly inapposite.").
156.

THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY (Edward A. Polloway, ed.

2015). See Quince, 241 So.3d at 61-62.
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adjustment of all IQ scores in Atkins cases that were derived from
tests with outdated norms to account for the Flynn Effect, "Hallindicated that being informed by the medical community does not
demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical
guide."15 7 The Fifth Circuit has never endorsed the use of the Flynn
Effect in death penalty cases. 15 8

iii.

The Different IQ Tests

The IQ test that was most commonly used in these seventy
cases was the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (III or IV). While
over half (55.7%) of cases used the full-scale form of this test, fewer
than one-quarter (22.9%) of cases analyzed either used the WAIS-R
concurrently or used this shortened form instead. These tests have
often been considered to be the "gold standard" for testing intellectual capacity in both clinical settings and criminal courts. 159

157.
158.

Moorej, 137 S. Ct. at 1049.
See In re Cathey, 857 F.3d 221, 227 n.33 (5th Cir. 2017) ("This Court has routinely

declined to address Flynn Effect arguments, typically reciting some version of the following:
'the Flynn Effect "has not been accepted in this Circuit as scientifically valid."'); see also Gray

v.

Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 446 n.9 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Mathis, 483 F.3d 395, 398 n.1

(5th Cir. 2007)) ("Importantly, however, nor has the Flynn Effect been rejected.... We
also note the Eleventh Circuit's recent conclusion that district courts, upon their consideration of the expert testimony, may apply or reject the Flynn Effect, which is a finding of fact
reviewed for clear error."); Ledford v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison,

818 F.3d 600, 640 (11th Cir. 2016); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2005)
(directing district court to consider Flynn Effect evidence).

159. David E. Hartman, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV (WAIS I): Return of the Gold
Standard, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 85, 85-87 (2009); seeJohn Matthew Fabian, William W. Thompson & Jeffrey B. Lazarus, Life, Death, and IQ: It's Much More than Just a Score.
Understandingand UtilizingForensic Psychological and NeuropsychologicalEvaluations in Atkins

Intellectual Disability/MentalRetardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399, 413 (2011) ("the
WAIS-IV is the most current version of the WAIS tests and should be used in Atkins evaluations"). On the differences between the WAIS-R and the WAIS-III tests, see Suzanne Fitzgerald, Nicola S. Gray & Robert J. Snowden, A Comparison of WAIS-R and WAIS-III in the Lower

IQ Range: Implications

fr

Learning Disability Diagnosis, 20

J.

APPLIED RES. IN INTELL.

DISABILITIES 323 (2007). In death penalty cases, expert witnesses invariably refer to this test

as the "gold standard." See, e.g., United States v. Roland, 281 F.Supp.3d 470, 504 n.49 (D.N.J.
2017) ("See, e.g., D.E. No. 386, Tr. at 54 (Dr. Hunter testifying that there is very little dispute

that the WAIS is the 'gold standard' IQ test); D.E. No. 422, Tr. at 178 (Dr. Bigler testifying
that WAIS is the 'gold standard')"); United States v. Smith, 790 F. Supp. 2d. 482, 491 (E.D.
La. 2011) ("the WAIS-III is a gold standard for [intelligence] testing"); cf United States v.

Montgomery, 2014 WL 1516147, *26 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) ("Expert witnesses for both Defendant and the Government described the Wechsler family of IQ tests-including the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Revised ("WISC-R") and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Fourth Edition ("WAIS IV")-as the 'gold standard' in intelligence test-

ing.").
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However, a 2011 study found that the Stanford-Binet ("SB5") IQ
test scores are consistently lower than full scale scores given by the
WAIS, with a mean difference of 16.7 points. 16 Silverman and his
colleagues believed that this difference may be due to the WAIS underestimating intellectual impairment. 16
Strikingly, only one of the defendants whose cases are reviewed in this article that proffered evidence of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) was potentially successful.16 2
Also developed by David Wechsler, this IQ test is supposed to deliver a score that is comparable to the WAIS tests, with the only key
difference being that the WISC is created to measure childhood intelligence scores.163 However, prior research has found scores on
the WISC-IV to be, on average, 11.82 points lower than scores on
the WAIS-III in a sample of sixteen-year-old special education students. 164 Other studies have contrastingly found the WAIS to consistently produce lower IQ scores than the WISC. 165
The reason WISC scores are often used in cases involving
Atkins claims is that this test is a well-accepted method for gauging
a defendant's IQ prior to the age of eighteen. 166 This is important
because in order for defendants to prove that the existence of an
intellectual disability that would qualify for death penalty exemption, they must be able to prove that their disability had its onset
before the age of eighteen. 167 Since the WISC, as suggested by Gordon and her colleagues and by Hannon and Kicklighter, does not
have consistent findings that can be compared to a defendant's current IQ score, one may conclude that despite popular belief, the
WISC would be an inadequate measures ofjuvenile IQ. 168

160.

Wayne Silverman et al., Stanford-Binet and WAISIQDierences and Their Implications

for Adults

with Intellectual Disability (aka Mental Retardation), 38 INTELLIGENCE 242, 242
(2010).
161. Id. at 248.
162. See generally Butler v. Quarterman, 576 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811-12 (S.D. Tex. 2008),
aff'd in part & vacated in part on other grounds sub. nom, Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641
(5th Cir. 2015).
163. Shirley Gordon et al., Comparison of the WAIS-II and WISC-IV in 16-Year-Old Special
Education Students, 23 J. APPL. RSCH. IN INTELL. DISABILITIES 197,197 (2010).
164. Id.
165.

See generally John E. Hannon & Richard Kicklighter, WAIS versus WISC in Adoles-

cents, 35J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 179-182 (1970).

166. See generally Bruce Frumkin, ChallengingExpert Testimony on Intelligence and Mental
Retardation, 34J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 51, 53-55 (2006).
167. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
168.

Gordon et al., supra note 163; Hannon & Kicklighter, supra note 165.
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Even though the WISC was used in 18.6% of the cases considered in this article, only one of these cases may turn out to be
successful in granting some form of preliminary relief.16 9 Furthermore, five of these defendants actually had higher WISC scores than
their WAIS scores. 170 All other defendants had similar scores between these two tests or did not have these scores reported. 171
Although, as already noted, the WAIS is considered to be the
"golden standard" for testing a defendant's IQ, Silverman and his
colleagues have suggested that "the WAIS might systematically underestimate severity of intellectual impairment. "172 These researchers compared seventy-four adults diagnosed with intellectual disability and found that, in every participant tested, their WAIS Full
Scale IQ was higher than their Stanford-Binet Composite IQ. 173 The
mean difference between the scores achieved on the WAIS and the
scores achieved on the Stanford-Binet was an astonishing 16.7
points.17 4 In order to determine which of these tests had a more
accurate measure of intelligence, Silverman and his colleagues
compared their results to the results of other tests aimed at assessing
intelligence, such as the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale, the
WISC, the Leiter, and the Slosson tests of intelligence.17 5 Despite

169.

See Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641 (5th Cir. 2015); Matamoros v. Stephens,

783 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2015); Garcia v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2014); Chester v.
Thaler, 666 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2011); Hines v. Thaler, 456 F. App'x 357 (5th Cir. 2011);
Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d 291 (5th Cir.
2010); Simpson v. Quarterman, 341 F. App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2009); Hall v. Quarterman, 534
F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Taylor, 298 F. App'x 385 (5th Cir. 2008); Moore v. Quarterman, 517 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2007); Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580 (5th Cir. 2007). Butler was the only one of these cases that may, potentially, be a success. See Appendix C.

170. Garcia, 757 F.3d at 224; Mathis, 616 F.3d at 461; Hall, 534 F.3d at 365; In re Taylor,
298 F. App'x at 385; Woods, 493 F.3d at 580.
171.

See Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641 (5th Cir. 2015); Matamoros v. Stephens,

783 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2015); Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2011); Hines v. Thaler, 456 F. App'x 357 (5th Cir. 2011); Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2010);
Simpson v. Quarterman, 341 F. App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2009); Moore v. Quarterman, 517 F.3d

781 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2007). See Appendix C for more
information.
172.

Silverman et al., supra note 160, at 242.

173.
174.

Id. at 244.
Id.

175.

Id. at 243, 245-46. See Cameron R. Pepperdine & Adam W. McCrimmon, Test Re-

view: Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, Third Edition (Vineland-3) by Sparrow, S. S., Cicchetti, D.
V., & Saulnier, C. A., 33 CAN.J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 157 (2018) (describing and reviewing the
Vineland test); Isaac L. Woods Jr. et al., What Is in a Name? A HistoricalReview of Intelligence
Test Score Labels, 37J. PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT 692 (2019) (discussing the Leiter
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having a more limited data set, it was determined that the StanfordBinet was consistently more comparable to the scores achieved on
these tests than the WAIS.17 6 For instance, Silverman and his colleagues concluded that "while there was no difference between
Stanford-Binet and Vineland scores, t (14) = 0.22, p> 0.8, WAIS
scores were significantly higher than their Vineland counter-

parts, t (16)

=

6.74, p < .00001" (2010).177 Therefore, according to

this research, the WAIS seems to produce consistently higher IQ
scores than other tests aside from the WISC.
In sum, the introduction of the WAIS test (in numerous versions) was significantly related to a successful outcome, and contrarily, the introduction of the WISC test almost always produced an
unsuccessful outcome in these cases. 178
C.

The Successes: The "trifecta"offactors making actual
relief more likely: the rebuttal of malingering, the
mention of the Flynn Effect, and the use of the WAIS
test.

The use of three factors (1) malingering rebuttal, (2) reference to the Flynn Effect, and (3) use of the WAIS test were significantly related to a successful outcome. If these three factors were all
present, 179 it was more likely that defendants would prevail. There
were seven cases in which all three factors were present, two of
which were cases where defendants were re-sentenced to life in
and Slosson intelligence examinations); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson et al, ProtectingPeople

with Intellectual Disabilityfrom Wrongful Execution: Guidelines f]r Competent Representation, 46
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1120 n.63 (2018) (characterizing the Slosson test as not a reliable
measure of IQ).
176.

Silverman et al., supra note 160, at 245.

177.
178.
2015)).

Id. at 246.
See supra note 137 (discussing Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641 (5th Cir.

179.

We are here using the word "present" broadly. Thus, whereas there is no mention

of malingering or the Flynn effect in the Fifth Circuit opinion In re Chase, 804 F.3d 738 (5th
Cir. 2015), the opinion appears to adopt, for these purposes, the reasoning of an earlier
state case, Chase v. State, 171 So.3d 463 (Miss. 2015), in which the latter court had stressed
that "a circuit court should not rely on unsupported testimony of malingering at variance
with the results of malingering tests," noting that "Chase met his burden of proof of subaverage intellectual functioning." Id. at 480-81. Similarly, the District Court in Butler v. Quarterman, 576 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812 (S.D. Tex. 2008), had noted there was no evidence of
malingering. Also, in an earlier proceeding in Weathers v. Davis, 659 F. App'x 778 (5th Cir.
2016), the court had noted that there was testimony that a defense witness did not believe
that the defendant was malingering. Weathers v. Stephens, 2015 WL 5098872, * 14 (E.D.

Tex. 2015).
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prison. 180 In one case, execution was barred 181 and three cases are
pending further developments.1 8 2 In just one case of these seven has
an execution been scheduled. 183 Although these findings do not reflect either causation or correlation, they prove that a significant
relationship exists between the independent factors and case outcomes.
Thus, by way of example, in Brumfield v. Cain,184 an expert
"ruled out malingering as a possible explanation for Brumfield's IQ
scores," 185 (on WAIS tests administered by both the defense and
state experts), 186 and the opinion discusses the possible impact of
the Flynn effect as well. 187 In Wiley v. Epps, 188 the defendant was
given WAIS tests 189and an expert explained the significance of the
Flynn effect.19 0 The court concluded that "each of the experts who
testified at the evidentiary hearing conducted testing to probe for

180. Brumfield v. Cain, 808 F.3d 1041,1066 (5th Cir. 2015); Moore v. Quarterman, 342
F. App'x. 65, 65 (5th Cir. 2009).
181. Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2010). This defendant, however, died in
prison awaiting further proceedings. See Susy Dahmer, Comment to Mississippi Prison and

fail Specific Discussions, PRISON

TALK (July 5, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.prisontalk.com/
forums/showthread.php?t=552638.
182. The Chasedefendant demonstrated that he met the statutory requirements to file
a successive habeas application. In re Chase, 804 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2015). Weathers' case
has been remanded to state trial court for a new hearing in light of Moore II Email from

John "Bud" Ritenour, Weathers' current counsel, to the authors (July 13, 2020) (on file with
authors); Weathers v. Davis, 659 F. App'x 778 (5th Cir. 2016). In Butler, the District Attorney's office has agreed to new IQ testing (now postponed because of prison closure due to
COVID-19), and agrees that, if Butler's score is seventy-five or below, he will agree to a

resentencing. Ex parteButler, No. WR-41, 121-03 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App., Sept. 18, 2019), on
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Cause No. 511112 in the 185th District Court; Butler

v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641 (5th Cir. 2015), on remand from 600 F. App'x 246 (5th Cir.
2015).
183. See Busby v. Davis, 925 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2019). The execution had been scheduled for May 6, 2020 but was postponed because of COVID-19. See Execution of Texas inmate

convicted ofhillingproftssor, 77, delayed, KWTX (Apr. 28, 2020, 2:48 PM),
https://www.kwtx.com/content/news/Execution-of-Texas-inmate-convicted-of-killing-pro-

fessor-77-delayed-570014061.html.
184. 808 F.3d 1041 (5th Cir. 2015).
185. Id. at 1047 n.8.
186. Id. at 1047-48.
187.

Id. at 1060 n.27 (noting that it "was not necessary to decide whether to recognize

the Flynn effect in this case, however, as Brumfield's scores satisfy the first prong of the
intellectual disability test without a Flynn effect adjustment").

188.
189.
190.

625 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 203.
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malingering.191 Dr. O'Brien, Dr. Swanson, and Dr. Macvaugh each
indicated that there was no evidence that Wiley was feigning or malingering intellectual or adaptive functioning deficits. 192 And, in
Busby v. Davis,193 in which defendant had been given the WAIS
test, 194 the court considered the impact of the Flynn effect and the
fact that the defense expert found no malingering, 195 in holding
that reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court had
properly denied habeas petitioner's Atkins claim, that he was intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for execution, so that a certificate of appealability was warranted. 196
D. The Failures: The Fifth Circuit's Global Errors
It is important here to specifically consider cohorts of cases
in which the Fifth Circuit-clearly and beyond doubt-relied on
false science 197 and false "ordinary common sense" 198 to reject defendants' Atkins claims. These cases reflect its obsessive fear of defendants successfully malingering intellectual disability, 199 its

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 221.
Id. at 221-22.
677 F. App'x 884 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id.

197.

On how 'junk science" improperly influences how a criminal defendant is treated

in the judicial system, seeMichael L. Perlin &AlisonJ. Lynch, "Mr. Bad Example": Why Lawyers
Need to Embrace TherapeuticJurisprudence to Root out Sanism in the Representation of Persons with

MentalDisabilities,16 WYo. L. REv. 299, 312 (2016); Michael L. Perlin, "DeceivedMe into Thinking/I Had Something to Protect":A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of When Multiple Experts Are
Necessary in Cases in which Fact-FindersRely on HeuristicReasoning and "Ordinary Common Sense",

13 LAwJ. Soc.JUST. 88, 118-19 (2020) [hereinafter Perlin, Deceived Me].
198. "Ordinary common sense" is "a powerful unconscious animator of legal decision
making that reflects "idiosyncratic, reactive decisionmaking," and "is a psychological construct that reflects the level of the disparity between perception and reality that regularly
pervades the judiciary in deciding cases involving individuals with mental disabilities." Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7, at 281, citing, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics
and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and HeuristicReasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3,

22-23, 29 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, Psychodynamics], and Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and
Dominance:A Study of RhetoricalFields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737-38
(1988).
199. See, e.g., Mossman, supra note 148, at 276-77. One of the authors (Michael L. Perlin) wrote this just months after the decision in Atkins:
Dr. Dorothy Lewis documented that juveniles imprisoned on death row
were quick to tell her and her associates, "I'm not crazy," or "I'm not a
retard." Moreover, a person with mental retardation will often attempt to
conceal his condition from lawyers, not realizing that his condition could
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rejection of the validity of the WISC test,2 00 its reliance on so-called
ethnic adjustments,201 its failure to understand how most of us misunderstand expressions of remorse, 202 and, as discussed extensively
in our previous article, its failures to implement Strickland v. Washington in cases involving defendants with mental disabilities. 203
i.

Failure to Rebut Malingering

As we have already noted, if defense counsel did not rebut
allegations of malingering, Atkins claims were practically universally
unsuccessful. 204 Thus, in Simpson v. Quarterman,2 0 the Court concluded that Simpson "had a very strong incentive to malinger in
light of Atkins and Brisenowhen being tested by [the examining psychologists] in 2008," some eight years after his conviction and death
sentence. 206 Interestingly, the Court noted that the state's expert
"admitted he has tested many defendants for the State of Texas, but

constitute a major part of his defense. Especially in a case in which counsel
is substandard, this could-again-be fatal to a defendant who ought otherwise come under the Atkins umbrella.
Perlin, Lie Is in Mirrors, supra note 18, at 342 (citing Joseph A. Nese, Jr., The Fateof Mentally
Retarded Criminals: An Examination of the Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REv. 373, 383 (2002) and ROSA EHRENREICH &JAMIE FELLNER, BEYOND
REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 4 (Malcolm
Smart & Cynthia Brown eds., Hum. Rts. Watch) (2001)).

200.

See infra Section III.D.ii.

201.

On how such reliance reflects a corruption of the criminal justice system, see Per-

lin, Corrupt Ways, supra note 13.
202. See infra Section III.D.iv.
203.

See Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supranote 7.

204. See, e.g., Ibarra v. Davis, 786 F. App'x 420 (5th Cir. 2019); Rockwell v. Davis, 853
F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2017); Ladd v. Livingston, 777 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2015); Ladd v. Stephens,
748 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 2014); Simpson v. Quarterman, 341 F. App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2009),
dismissing appealfrom 593 F. Supp. 2d 922 (E.D. Tex. 2009); Perkins v. Quarterman, 254 F.
App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Quarterman, 498 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007); Clark v.
Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006); Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2006).
For subsequent developments on other grounds, see In re Taylor, 298 F. App'x 385 (5th Cir.

2008); Williams v. Stephens, 761 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 2014). Although no version of the root
word "malinger" appears in the litigation in Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 586 (5th
Cir. 2007), the court there concluded that "Woods' lowest IQ score was attainedwhen he had
an incentive to perform poorly, but Woods' IQ scores were higher when he had no such incentive" (emphasis added).

205. 341 F. App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1039 (2009).
206. 593 F. Supp. 2d 922, 936 (E.D. Tex. 2009), appeal dismissed, 341 F. App'x 68 (5th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1039 (2009).
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could not name one he found not to be malingering." 20 7 It does not
appear that this issue was ever dealt with by trial counsel.
In Ladd v. Stephens, 208 the Court found that the defendant
was properly denied habeas relief, notwithstanding the testimony of
his expert witness that he had "significantly sub-average intellectual
functioning,"209 accepting a state expert's opinion that the defendant "had a propensity for 'prevarication' and low motivation," and
that defendant's subsequent IQ score of sixty was "unreliable because of malingering." 2 1 And, in Woods v. Quarterman,211 a case in
which the defendant's IQ scores fluctuated from sixty-eight to
eighty-six,2 1 2 in finding that the state court's decision that Woods
"failed to demonstrate that he suffered from subaverage general intellectual functioning was not unreasonable," 2 1 3 the court concluded that "Woods' IQ scores were higher when he had no ...
incentive to perform poorly," suggesting that he was malingering.21 4
No effort from the defense to refute this suggestion was mentioned
in the opinion.21 5

ii.

Use of WISC Test

Also, in those cases in which the defendant relied upon the
WISC IQ test, his efforts on appeal were uniformly thwarted. Thus,
21
in Taylor v. Quarterman,
1 the doctor who administered the WISC
test when Taylor was a child (ten years old) had stated that Taylor
"was capable of performing better than a 75, had he tried."2 1 7 Also,
a WAIS-III score of sixty-five was discounted by the state habeas
207.
208.

Simpson, F. Supp. 2d at 937.
Ladd v. Stephens, 748 F. 3d 637 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 880 (2014).

For later proceedings, see Ladd v. Livingston, 777 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135

S. Ct. 1197 (2015).
209. Ladd, 748 F. 3d at 641. This conclusion was based on an IQ score of 67 that Ladd
received at age 13, as well as an opinion from the Texas Youth Commissions psychiatrist
that "Ladd appeared mentally retarded." Id.

210.

Id. at 643.

211.

Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580 (5th Cir. 2007). For subsequent proceedings,

see In re Woods, 296 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1073
(2009).
212. Woods, 493 F.3d at 585-86.
213. Id. at 586.
214. Id.
215. Litigation is continuing in Long v. Davis, 706 F.App'x 181 (5th Cir. 2017). See Appendix C.
216. Taylor v. Quarterman, 498 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007).
217. Id. at 307.
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court "due to the incentive to malinger." 2 18 Similarly, in In re
Mathis, 219 although the defendant had been scored at sixty-four and
sixty-two in WAIS tests, his WISC score of seventy-nine led-in
part-to the Court rejecting his claims. 2 20 And, in Simpson v. Quarterman,221 where the defendant had received scores of seventy-one
on the WISC test (in sixth grade) and seventy-eight (at age fifteen),
the fact that he achieved a full-scale score of seventy-one on the
WAIS-III in 2000, resulted in part in the rejection of Simpson's
claims.222
iii.

Use of "Ethnic Adjustments"

Some prosecution experts have endorsed the use of what
have been characterized as "ethnic adjustments" in death penalty
cases-artificially adding points to the IQ scores of minority death
penalty defendants-so as to make such defendants, who would otherwise have been protected by Atkins and, later, by Hall v. Florida,
eligible for the death penalty.223 In his comprehensive discussion of
this issue, Professor Robert Sanger accurately concluded that "ethnic adjustments" are not appropriate, clinically or logically, when
calculating a defendant's IQ score for Atkins purposes. "224 Further,
he relied on epigenetics to demonstrate that environmental factors,
such as childhood abuse, poverty, stress, and trauma, can result in
lower IQ scores, and that "ethnic adjustments" make it more likely
that such individuals-authentically "intellectually disabled"-will
be sentenced and put to death.2 2 5

218. Id. at 308.
219. In re Mathis, 483 F. 3d 395 (5th Cir. 2007).
220. Id. at 397-98.
221. 341 F. App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2009).
222. Id.; 593 F.Supp.2d 922, 934 (E.D. Tex. 2009), appealdismissed, 341 F. App'x 68 (5th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1039 (2009).
223. Sanger, supra note 13, at 108-16. On how some prosecutors "suggest that although
a capital defendant may 'technically' be considered retarded, he nonetheless has 'street
smarts'-and hence should receive the highest penalty," seeJamie Fellner, Beyond Reason:
Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28 HUM. RTs. WATCH 9,12 (2002).
224.

Sanger, supranote 13, at 146.

225.

Id., at 145-46. "The causal interactions between genes and their products, which

bring the phenotype into being." See CONRAD H. WADDINGTON, The Basic Ideas of Biology, in
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE 1, 9-10 (Conrad H. Waddington ed., 1968); see also Fabian, Thompson
& Lazarus, supra note 159, at 414 (noting that the steady increase of the general population's IQ scores over time could be attributed to cultural changes, improved nutrition, testing experience, changes in schooling and child-rearing practices, and improved technology). Some of the forensic psychologists who have employed such adjustments in their
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In three cases, the Fifth Circuit affirmed death sentences in
cases in which the discredited "ethnic adjustment" theory was
used.2 2 6 Thus, in Hernandez v. Stephens,2" the defendant's appeal was
denied, "[a]lthough the inmate's IQ scores were generally within
the range of mental retardation." 228 There, where defendant's IQ
scores ranged from fifty-two to fifty-seven, to, on one occasion,
eighty-seven, 2 2 9 a state's witness resolved the ambiguities by giving
defendant a score of seventy when "his results were scaled to Mexican norms." 2 30 Significantly, the Circuit concluded that "IQ tests below may not be mentally retarded." 2 31 Again, it emphasized that
"[w]hen scaled to Mexican norms, Hernandez scored exactly 70 on

testimony are named and criticized in Shapiro et al., supranote 13 (discussing ethical issues
raised by such testimony). On how the use of such fraudulent testimony may rise to the level
of prosecutorial misconduct, see Perlin, Corrupt Ways, supra note 13, at 1453 (quoting, in
part, James K. McAfee & Michele Gural, Individuals with Mental Retardation and the Criminal

Justice System: The View from States'Attorneys General, 26 MENTAL RETARDATION 5, 5 (1988)
("There has never been any 'pushback' against the argument that prosecutors regularly
minimize the existence of intellectual disability. Tellingly, a survey of state attorneys general
revealed that the identification of persons with intellectual disability in the criminal justice
system 'is neither systematic nor probable."').
226.

Two cases involving Dr. Denkowski's testimony had different ultimate dispositions.

In Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F. 3d 197, 212 (5th Cir. 2010), where the witness "opined that
Pierce's IQ might actually be slightly higher than this score suggested because Pierce suffered from moderate anxiety and mild depression, which may have suppressed the score,"
the defendant was ultimately resentenced to life without parole. SeeAllan Turner, DA 's Office
Plans to Not Seek Execution of Man on Death Row Since 1978, CHRON (last updated Aug. 30,
2012, 3:00 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/DA-s-office-plans-tonot-seek-execution-of-man-on-3825169.php. In Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641, 644
(5th Cir. 2015), where the district court had found Dr. Denkowski to be "credible," four
years later, the District Attorney's office agreed to new IQ testing, and will agree to a resentencing if Butler's score is 75 or below. E-mail from Richard Burr, United States Senator for
North Carolina, to author (June 8, 2020 1:19 PM) (on file with author). Dr. Denkowski was
also a witness in Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 371 n.27 (5th Cir. 2008), a case in which
"the trial court relied [on Dr. Denkowski's affidavit] in finding that Hall was not mentally
retarded, [an affidavit that] indicated incorrectly that Dr. Church's examination of Hallproduced
an IQ score of 72; the score was inflact a 67' (emphasis added).

227.
228.
229.

Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F. App'x 531, 539 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 536.

230. Id. In this case, it appears that a suggestion of malingering or at least intentional
underperforming of the defendant was accused and may partially explain one witness's
opinion that the defendant "was not mentally retarded," and that that the defendant's "motivational variables likely played a role in the below-average scores." Id. at 537 (witness did
not interview defendant himself).
231.

Id. at 539. Here, pointedly, the Circuit relied on its prior opinion in Lewis v. Thaler,

701 F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting the since-discredited case of Briseno, 135 S.W.3d
at 7 n.24).
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the one full-scale WAIS-III test." 2 32 The district court further found
evidence that "Hernandez's motivation to score lower could have
been a factor in the test results." 2 33
In Maldonado v. Thaler,234 the state's expert, Dr. George Denkowski, was a clinical psychologist who had been severely criticized
and discredited based on his methodology, testing protocols, and
"evaluation and scoring of Maldonado's intellectual functioning." 235 Although the circuit court conceded that the Texas Board
of Psychological Examiners had found that "the adjustments [Dr.
Denkowski used] were not scientifically valid," 2 3 it nonetheless
found that the defendant "cannot meet his burden of showing that
the state court's finding that he is not mentally retarded was either
an unreasonable application of Atkins or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state
court. "237

Although noting that the "upward adjustments that Dr. Denkowski made to Maldonado's WAIS-III score" were of greater concern" because they "did not result from any statistical formula or
established methodology and [because] Dr. Denkowski lacked the
cultural knowledge to properly and accurately adjust for the effects
of Maldonado's impoverished upbringing in rural Mexico," 2 38 the
court concluded that, even if "Dr. Denkowski's testimony is

232.
233.
234.

Hernandez, 537 F. App'x at 539.
Id.
Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2010).

235.

Id. at 234. See Shapiro et al, supra note 13, at 266-67 (discussing complaints filed

with the Texas Board of Examiners of Psychologists in 2009; also noting that that Dr.
Denkowski had used "unscientific methods that artificially inflated intelligence scores
in order to make defendants eligible for the death penalty"); see also, Perlin, Corrupt
Ways, supra note 13, at 1451-52 (discussing how District Attorneys in Texas "continued
to use Dr. Denkowski as an expert witness even after he was judicially rebuked," and quoting

Brandi Grissom, County Used DoctorAfter Methods Challenged, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 26, 2011, 11:00
AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/04/26/county-used-doctor-after-methods-challenged (reporting that Harris County continued to pay Dr. Denkowski to examine defendants for intellectual disabilities "even after ajudge harshly rebuked his work")). In 2011, Dr.
Denkowski had entered into a settlement agreement in which his license was "repri-

manded." See Ex parteMatamoros, 2012 WL 4713563, * (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2012).
236. Maldonado, 625 F. 3d at 234.
237. Id. at 236. Dr. Denkowski administered the WAIS III test with the assistance of an
interpreter who was licensed in Spanish/English translation, but who did not have a background in psychology and had no previous experience translating a "psychological instrument before Maldonado's examination." Id. at 236-37.

238.

Id. at 238.
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completely disregarded, with the remaining evidence, [defendant]
could not meet his burden for obtaining federal habeas relief."2 39
Finally, in Rivera v. Quarterman,240 where the court ultimately
found that the defendant was intellectually disabled, suffering from
"significant sub-average intellectual functioning," 24 1 the state had
argued for the use of ethnic adjustments, claiming that defendant's
"verbal IQ score of 66 [was] unreliable and dragged down his overall result." 24 2
Here, the state also argued that the district court erred in
rejecting four pre-Atkins IQ scores of seventy, eighty-five, ninety-two
and eighty; these were rejected because "they were not from fullscale Wechsler tests." 24 3 Because, in part, of expert testimony that
"IQ tests given in the criminal justice system don't hold much
weight because of the wide variation,"244 the court ultimately found
"no clear error in the district court's determination that Rivera has
significantly sub-average intellectual functioning,"245 affirming the
finding that "Rivera is mentally retarded." 2 4 6
iv.

Alleged Lack of Remorse

The Supreme Court is cognizant of how the assessment of
remorse and compassion might be the dispositive factor to jurors in
death penalty cases. 2 47 Concurring in Riggins v. Nevada, in which the

239. Id. at 239. The defendant also argued unsuccessfully that Dr. Denkowski did not
take the "Flynn Effect" into consideration. Id. at 238.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.

246. Rivera, 505 F.3d at 363. In yet another case involving Dr. Denkowski's testimony,
the defendant presented evidence that that witness had "entered into a settlement agreement with the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists in which he agreed to 'not
accept any engagement to perform forensic psychological services in the evaluation of subjects for mental retardation or intellectual disability in criminal proceedings."' Matamoros
v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2015). However, the court concluded that, even
after excluding Dr. Denkowski's testimony, the defendant had not shown "clearly and convincingly that the court of Criminal Appeal's decision that the defendant did not meet his
burden of proof-was unreasonable." Id. at 220, 227.
247. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, 'Something's Happening
Here/But You Don't Know What It Is': HowJurors (Mis)ConstrueAutism in the Criminal TrialProcess, U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021)
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3664705)

thing's Happening].

(draft available
at https://pa[hereinafter Perlin & Cucolo, Some-
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Supreme Court held that competent insanity-pleaders had a qualified right to refuse medication at trial, 248 Justice Kennedy underscored that "[a] ssessments of character and remorse may carry great
weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether the offender lives
or dies." 249 In that case, Riggins had been medicated with 800 milligrams of the drug Mellaril, considered to be within the "toxic
range"; 2 0 an expert in the case testified that that was sufficient dosage with which to "tranquilize an elephant."12 1 Justice Kennedy relied on research by William Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam,
whose research demonstrated that assessment of remorse might be
the dispositive factor to jurors in death penalty cases. 25 2
Subsequently, in Atkins, it held that demeanor of such defendants may create an unwarranted impression of a lack of remorse for their crimes. 2 3 This impression, of course, in the death
penalty context, could "enhance the likelihood that the jury will impose the death penalty due to a belief that they pose a future danger."25 4
In particular, judges must explain to jurors that they cannot
rely on their false "ordinary common sense"2 5 5 about what remorse
"looks like" or what an empathetic person "looks like." 256 Again,

248.
249.
250.
251.

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 143.

252. Id. at 143-44 (citing Geimer & Amsterdam, supranote 30, at 51-52); see also Perlin,
Merchants and Thieves, supra note 9, at 1531.

253.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 at 320-21 (2004) (noting the difficulties persons

with intellectual disabilities (then characterized as mental retardation) may have in being
able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel as well as their status as "typically poor
witnesses.").

254.

SeeJohn H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the VoliS.C. L. REv. 93, 108 (2003).

tionally Incapacitated, and the Death Penalty, 55
255.

See Perlin & Cucolo, Something'sHappening, supra note 247 (citing Perlin, Harmon

& Chatt, supra note 7, at 281 (explaining the meaning of "ordinary common sense" in this
context (citing Sherwin, supranote 198, at 737-38, and Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note
198, at 29))). Ordinary common sense presupposes two "self-evident" truths: first, everyone
knows how to assess an individual's behavior; and second, everyone knows when to blame
someone for doing wrong.

Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The

Anthropology ofInsanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 17 (1996). It
is self-referential and non-reflective; "I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I
see it that way, therefore that's the way it is." Perlin, Dorfman & Weinstein, supra note 141,

at 88.
256.

This, of course, presupposes that judges do not fall prey to the same sort of false

ordinary common sense. See, e.g., Colleen M. Berryessa,JudiciaryViews on CriminalBehaviour
and Intention of Offenders with High-FunctioningAutism, 5 J. INTELL. DISAB. & OFFENDING
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judges must make clear that jurors' "ordinary common sense" is
simply wrong-that it is premised on media stereotypes or, perhaps,
the heuristic of one person that they may know, and that it cannot
be left unchecked or guide their decisions in reaching a verdict. 27
In cases in which Atkins claims were rejected, in cases where
they were successful, and in cases involving other mental disability
issues beyond those related specifically to intellectual disability, the
Fifth Circuit decisions reveal no reflection on the remorse-related
issues just discussed. 2 8
v.

Issues Related to Effectiveness of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court had found
that counsel would be ineffective if his or her "conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial
court cannot be relied on as having produced ajust result." 2 9 The
Court established a two-part test to assess whether counsel's assistance was "so defective as to require reversal":2 0
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the

BEHAV. 97 (2014) (interviewedjudges that believed persons with autism do not have control
of their behavior).
257.

See, e.g., Colleen Berryessa, JudicialPerceptions of Media Portrayalsof Ofenders with

High FunctioningAutistic Spectrum Disorders, 3 INT'LJ. CRIM. Socio. 46 (2014). On how ordinary common sense is supported by cognitive-simplifying heuristics, see Perlin & Cucolo,
Something's Happening, supra note 247, at 453.

258.

See, e.g., Mathis v. Dretke, No. 04-70015, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4210, at *26 (5th

Cir. Mar. 11, 2005) (including testimony from ajailhouse informant that "Mathis confessed
to the killings and expressed no remorse") (finding that the Atkins claim failed); Williams
v. Stephens, 761 F.3d 561, 568 (5th Cir. 2014) (including testimony from state experts as to
defendant's "lack of remorse") (finding that the Atkins claim failed); Martinez v. Davis, No.

15-70017, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11640, at *9 (5th Cir.June 24, 2016) (including testimony
from family members that defendant "showed little remorse"), vacated 137 S. Ct. 1432

(2017); Sells v. Stephens, No. 12-70028, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14799, at *5-6 (5th Cir. July
22, 2013) (including testimony from the state's witness that defendant "displayed no re-

morse"); Sigala v. Quarterman, No. 08-70013, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 16026, at *19 (5th Cir.
July 20, 2009) (quoting Ex parteSigala, No. 62,283-01, slip op. at 21 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug.
31, 2005)); Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 2007) (detailing how immediately following the murders, "Coble made comments that indicated his lack of remorse").

259.
260.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Id. at 687.
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deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable. 21
The "objective" of "reasonably effective assistance" standard
was to be measured by "simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 26 2 As part of this measurement, the Court would
"indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.1"263 We must
keep this "pallid" standard 264 in mind throughout this investigatln265
tion.2e

Thus, efforts by Atkins defendants to come under the umbrella of the standard of adequacy of counsel announced in Strickland were nearly uniformly unsuccessful. Of the twenty-two cases in

261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id. at 687-88.
Id. at 689.

264. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "And I See Through Your Brain": Access to Experts,
Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the

Criminal TrialProcess, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, *24 n.88 (2009).
265. See generally Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7, at 264 (explaining how "the
charade of 'adequacy of counsel law' fails miserably" in the Fifth Circuit).
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which Stricklandwas raised, 266 there was partial success in only three:
Pierce v. Thaler,267 Butler v. Stephens,26s and Busby v. Davis.26 9
In Pierce, the Fifth Circuit initially ruled that the defendant
was entitled to a certificate of appealability ("COA") on his ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 270 Subsequently, however, the same court
ruled that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
in the federal district court on his claim under Atkins, that his intellectual disability estopped the state from executing him. 271 Eventually, after thirty-five years on death row, the defendant was resentenced to life without parole. 272 In Busby, the Fifth Circuit granted
a COA on the questions of whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, and whether trial counsel
was ineffective by failing to conduct an adequate sentencing investigation or to present an adequate mitigation case during the

266. SeeIbarra v. Davis, No. 17-70014, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 25535, at *6 (5th Cir. Aug.
26, 2019); Butler v. Stephens, No. 18-70006, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 22494, at *10 (5th Cir.
Aug. 14, 2018); Guevara v. Davis, No. 16-70004, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2374, at *1-2 (5th
Cir. Feb. 9, 2017); Rockwell v. Davis, 853 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 2017); Shore v. Davis, 845
F.3d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 2017); Martinez v. Davis, No. 15-70017, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11640,
at *9 (5th Cir. June 24, 2016); Segundo v. Davis, 831 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2016); In re
Chase, 804 F.3d 738, 738 (5th Cir. 2015); Guevara v. Stephens, No. 13-70003, 2014 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15357, at *10 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 2014); Mays v. Stephens, 757 F. 3d 211, 214
(5th Cir. 2014); Williams v. Stephens, 761 F.3d 561, 566 (5th Cir. 2014); Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bourgeois, No. 11-70024, 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS 16168, at *39 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2013); Ripkowski v. Thaler, No. 10-70021,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17346, at *21 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2011); Esparza v. Thaler, No. 1070009, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23368, at *23 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2010); Pierce v. Thaler, No. 0870042, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8031, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 2010); Perkins v. Quarterman,
No. 07-70010, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26523, at *10 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 2007); Mathis v.
Dretke, No. 04-70015, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4210, at *34 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2005); United
States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 2004); Ladd v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349, 357
(5th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002), abrogatedby Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Thomas v. Cockrell, No. 01-11475, 2002 WL 31730148, at *4
(5th Cir. Nov. 18, 2002) (rejecting Thomas's argument that his "counsel was ineffective for
failing to place Thomas's mental condition in issue during the guilt/innocence phase of
trial").

267.

Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App'x 784 (5th Cir. 2009), remanded to 604 F3d 197 (5th

Cir. 2010). Pierceis discussed in Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7, at 333.

268.
269.

Butler v. Stephens, 625 F. App'x 641 (5th Cir. 2015).
Busby v. Davis, 925 F3d 699 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 897 (2020).

270.

Pierce, 355 F. App'x at 796-97. Pierce's trial lawyer was subsequently suspended.

See In re Ronald G. Mock, Bd. Disciplinary App., Tex. (Dec. 8, 2004), http://txboda.org/
cases/re-ronald-g-mock.

271.

Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2010).

272. See Allan Turner, DA's Office Plans to Not Seek Execution of Man on Death Row Since
1978, CHRON (Aug. 30, 2012, 3:00 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/DA-s-office-plans-to-not-seek-execution-of-man-on-3825169.php.
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penalty phase of trial. 273 On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit held that
Busby did not establish ineffectiveness by counsel, and again affirmed the conviction, concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's allegedly deficient mitigation investigation. 274

In Butler, the court granted a COA on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to investigate and raise Butler's mental state regarding his competence to stand trial and as mitigation
evidence during sentencing,27 5 and, in a subsequent opinion, vacated the dismissal of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claim, remanding for further consideration. 27 Then, in a later case
on remand to the district court, his claims were ultimately rejected. 277
In short, the conclusion reached by one of the co-authors
some seven years ago-"Atkins [has] failed to prevent the execution
of persons with serious mental disabilities" 278-is still a valid one.
E.

TherapeuticJurisprudence & OtherJurisprudential
Filters
i.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence Generally 279

Therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ") recognizes that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. 280 It asks whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer
roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles. 2 81 Professor

677
925
600
625
745

F. App'x 884, 889 (5th Cir. 2017).
F.3d 699, 726 (5th Cir. 2019).
F. App'x 246, 247 (5th Cir. 2015).
F. App'x 641, 660 (5th Cir. 2015).
F. App'x 528, 529 (5th Cir. 2018). Busby is discussed in Perlin, Harmon

&

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Chatt, supra note 7, at 299-300.
278.

MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF

THE STATES 153 (2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, SHAME OF THE STATES].
279.

This section is largely adapted from Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supranote 7, at 305-

280.

It also distills the work of one of the authors over the past twenty-eight years, be-

08.
ginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is TherapeuticJurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 623 (1993).
281. Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got":
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
735, 751 (2005).
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David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent tension in this inquiry must be resolved: "[t]he key task is ... to determine how the
law can use mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning without impinging upon justice concerns." 282 As one of the
authors (Michael L. Perlin) has written elsewhere, "[a]n inquiry
into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns
'trump' civil rights and civil liberties." 283 Therapeutic jurisprudence
"look[s] at law as it actually impacts people's lives," 284 and TJ supports "an ethic of care." 285 It emphasizes psychological wellness over
adversarial triumphalism ."286 As noted in TherapeuticJurisprudence
and the Civil Rights of InstitutionalizedMentally DisabledPersons: Hopeless Oxymoron orPath to Redemption?, "The perception of receiving a fair
hearing is therapeutic because it contributes to the individual's
sense of dignity and conveys that he or she is being taken seriously.1"287
Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs" as: 288
> Voice: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance
to tell their story to a decisionmaker; 289
> Validation: the decision maker needs to take seriously the litigant's story; 290 and

282.

David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand ChangingConcepts ofLegal Scholarship,

11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
283. Michael L. Perlin, A Law ofHealing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000).
284.

Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: TherapeuticJurisprudence
Perspectives on Dealingwith Victims

of Crime, 33 NoVAL. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
285. Michael L. Perlin, "I've Got My Mind Made Up":How JudicialTeleology in Cases InvolvingBiologicallyBasedEvidence Violates TherapeuticJurisprudence,24 CARD. J. EQUAL RTs. & Soc.
JUST. 81, 94 (2018) (quoting, in part, Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of TherapeuticJurisprudence in Law School ClinicalEducation: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13

CLINIcAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006)) [hereinafter Perlin, Mind Made Up].
286.

Warren Brookbanks, Therapeuticjurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8

J.L. & MED. 328, 329-30 (2001).
287. Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, TherapeuticJurisprudence
and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to
Redemption?, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 114 (1995).
288.

See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-HelplessLawyer: ClinicalLegal Education and

TherapeuticJurisprudenceas Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).
289.

On the importance of "voice," see Ian Freckelton, TherapeuticJurisprudenceMisun-

derstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 588
(2008).
290.

Ronner, supra note 288, at 628.
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>

Voluntariness: in general, human beings prosper
when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 2 91
In discussing these "3 V's," Professor Ronner underscores:
"In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions." 292 The
question we need to consider here is the extent to which the Fifth
Circuit's post-Atkins decisions that are discussed in this paper comport with therapeutic jurisprudence principles.
ii.

TJ and the Cases Before Us

There is very little in the TJ literature about these issues. In
an earlier paper, one of the authors (Michael L. Perlin) has asked
whether we can "remotely speak of voice, validation, or voluntariness in the context of cases in which persons with intellectual disability inappropriately face the death penalty based on fraudulent
testimony premised on spurious 'ethnic adjustments"? 293 Elsewhere, in an article with other colleagues, the same co-author noted
that "psychological testing and a comprehensive review of relevant
contributing developmental factors can yield critical information
that can provide mitigation and potential solutions consistent with
the goals of therapeutic jurisprudence." 294 In an article with other
colleagues, the same co-author has noted-speaking specifically of
issues related to malingering-how "social science that enables
judges to satisfy predetermined positions is privileged." 295 David
Wexler has wisely suggested that, in some cases, an expert witness
might be called "to counter any claim of malingering." 296 And Monica Miller and her colleagues have argued that "expressions of remorse are central to the idea of . .. therapeutic jurisprudence." 297

291.

Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:Therapeutic

Jurisprudence,Miranda andJuveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 95 (2002).
292. Id.
293.

Perlin, Corrupt Ways, supra note 13, at 1457.

294.

Michael L. Perlin, Alison J. Lynch & Valerie R. McClain, "Some Things are Too Hot

to Touch ": Competency, the Right to Sexual Autonomy, and the Roles ofLawyers and Expert Witnesses,

35 TOURO L. REV. 405, 422 (2019).
295.

Perlin, Dorfman & Weinstein, supra note 141, at 94 n.222.

296.

David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand the RehabilitativeRole of the Criminal

Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 743, 755 n.60 (2005).
297. Monica K. Miller et al., How Emotion Affects the Trial Process, 92 JUDICATURE 56, 61
(2008). But see Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 8, at 279 ("[I]f jurors continue to 'translate' a
defendant's medicated state into evidence of non-remorse (thus enhancing the chances
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But otherwise, there is virtually nothing in the TJ literature on this
topic.
In writing about the Fifth Circuit's Strickland decisions in
cases involving mentally disabled defendants facing the death penalty, two of the authors of this article (Michael L. Perlin & Talia
Roitberg Harmon) concluded on this point:
It is fatuous to even consider whether the therapeutic
principles to which the creators of TJ have aspired are
part of either the trials of the defendants in this cohort
of cases or the actions by counsel. Certainly, "socio-psychological insights into the law and its application "298 are
utterly lacking, as is any shred of evidence of a commitment to dignity. The caselaw is totally bereft of . .. TJrequired fair process norms....299
The countenancing of the use of ethnic adjustments, the tiresome and threadbare allegations of malingering, 300 the sanist demands that remorse be exhibited in a way that comports with factfinders' false "ordinary common sense," the failure to employ accurate science in considering the potential impact of the Flynn Effect
or the type of IQ test used all basely, and disgracefully, violate the
most minimal standards of therapeutic jurisprudence, and ignore
any notion of "dignity." As the Circuit's interpretation of the Strickland standard "failed miserably as an aspirational bulwark" of due
process, 30 1 so has the Circuit similarly failed miserably in its inability
to bring "socio-psychological insights into [this area of] the law and
its application." 30 2 Do court procedures remotely "ensure that the
defendant has a 'voice?' 30 3 Are defense expert witnesses able to
that a death penalty will be meted out), what impact should this have on the right of criminal defendants to refuse such treatment?").
298.

Freckelton, supra note 289, at 576.

299.

Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7, at 307.

300.

See Fellner, supra note 223, at 12-13 (discussing the role of prosecution experts in

this context and explaining how prosecutors regularly "vigorously challenge the existence
of mental retardation [and] minimize its significance ... ").
301.

Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supranote 7, at 304.

302.

Freckelton, supranote 289, at 576; see also Perlin, Mind Made Up, supra note 285, at

81 ("Courts are, and have always been, teleological in cases involving litigants with mental
disabilities. By 'teleological,' I refer to outcome-determinative reasoning; social science that
enables judges to satisfy predetermined positions is privileged, while data that would require judges to question such ends are rejected.").
303.

PERLIN, SHAME OF THE STATES, supra note 278, at 67.
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"disentangle meanings of reports, to contextualize IQ scores, to explain acts that might seem to be otherwise inexplicable and contrary
to jurors' 'ordinary common sense?"'30 4 In the vast majority of cases,
fair process norms are totally absent. 30
IV.

CONCLUSION

The database we have considered here is infinitely depressing. There was only actual relief in 12.4% of the cases that raised
Atkins issues, and this grouping of nine cases includes two in which
the defendant died before the final relief could be implemented.
What it reveals is a Court with little or no interest in the thoughtful
opinions ofJustice Stevens in Atkins and ofJustice Kennedy in Hall.
The science and jurisprudence are ignored. Baseless fears of undetected malingering, the mindless use of lay stereotypes of what
"looks like" remorse, and the corrupt employment of "ethnic adjustments" to lawlessly raise IQ scores making certain minority defendants improperly eligible for execution all are reflected in the
cases decided by the Fifth Circuit. Certainly, the earlier conclusion
reached by Professor John Blume and his colleagues (in their empirical study of all Atkins claims)-that "Atkins is not evenhandedly
protecting those it was designed to protect" 306-rings as true today
as it did when written eleven years ago.
On the other hand, the cases reveal important potential
strategies for defense counsel: (1) It is essential that allegations of
malingering be vigorously rebutted through expert testimony; (2)
even though the Fifth Circuit has not yet acknowledged its scientific
validity, the Flynn effect must be brought to the Court's attention,
(3) the defendant should be given a WAIS test, and the WISC test
must be avoided, (4) the use of lay stereotypes of "showing remorse"
must be firmly discredited. If these are all done, then there is at
least some chance that Atkins and its progeny will be given life in
subsequent cases.
As we noted earlier, the song, License to Kill, upon which we
have drawn in part for our title, is about corruption and "the havoc
man wreaks upon himself." 307 In another lyric in the song, Dylan
304. Id. See Perlin, Deceived Me, supra note 197, at 118-19 (discussing on the potential
need for multiple experts in such cases).
305.

Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7, at 307.

306.

Blume et al., An EmpiricalLook, supra note 36, at 639.

307.

BOB DYLAN, License to Kill, on INFIDELS (Columbia Records 1983).
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sings, "Man has invented his doom.
In cases in which no expert
was offered to rebut allegations of malingering, or in which the
"wrong" IQ test was relied upon, counsel has "invented . . . doom"
for the client. 309 And sadly, there is no conclusion for us to reach
other than the Fifth Circuit-through its meretricious decisionmaking-has bestowed on state departments of corrections a license to kill.
Seven years ago, one of the co-authors of this article (Michael L. Perlin) wrote a book he titled MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES. 310 An alternative title for

this article could have been Mental Disability and the Death Penalty:
The Shame of the Fifth Circuit.

308.

Id.

309. See Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 7 (discussing the Fifth Circuit and adequacy of counsel generally).
310.

See PERLIN, SHAME OF THE STATES, supra note 278, at 153.
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APPENDIX A: CODING SHEET

Successful Atkins Claim? (Y/N)
Numerical IQ Score? (Y/N and actual IQ score number ([if
provided])

Not English Speaking? (Y/N)
"Borderline" ID Case? (Y/N)
Retroactive application? (Y/N)
Costs to identify ID? (Y/N; and what costs are)

Lack of Remorse? (Y/N)
Strickland Claim? (Y/N)
ID used as an aggravation? (Y/N)

Ake Claims? (Y/N)
Experts in case? (Y/N)

Expert who Explained IQ? (Y/N)
Did expert use/argue ethnic adjustments? (Y/N)
Did expert use/argue Flynn Effect? (Y/N)

Fake Claims mentioned? (Y/N)
Mental illness? (Y/N)
Expanding Atkins? (Y/N)
Use Briseno? (Y/N)
Mention Hall? (Y/N)
Mention Moore? (Y/N)
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF DEFENDANTS

Defendant Naie

Bell, Walter, Jr.

Blue, Carl Henry

Cases in the Fifth (ircuit (
Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F. 3d 330
(5th Cir. 2002).
Blue v. Thaler, 665 F. 3d 647
(5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568
U.S. 828 (2012), supplemented

Success?

Yes (SCR)
Successlife
No
Failure

on other grounds, sub. nom., Blue
v. Thaler (In re Blue), 514 F.

App'x 441 (5th Cir. 2013).
Bourgeois,

United States v. Bourgeois, 537

No

Alfred

F. App'x 604 (5th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 827

Failure

(2014), supplemented on other
grounds, sub.. nom., In re

Bourgeois, 902 F. 3d 446
(5th Cir. 2018).
Brown, Mauriceo

In re Brown, 457 F. 3d 392 (5th

No

Mashawn
Brumfield,

Cir. 2006).
Brumfield v. Cain, 740 F. 3d

Failure
Yes

Kevan

946 (5th Cir. 2014), cert den.,

Success-

576 U.S. 305 (2015). For earlier

life

litigation in the Brumfield case,
see, e.g., Brumfield v. Cain, 808

Busby, Edward
Lee

F. 3d 1041 (5th Cir. 2015) and
Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F. 3d
918 (5th Cir. 2014).
Busby v. Davis, 925 F. 3d 699
(5th Cir. 2019), cert den., 140 S.

Partial
Partial

Ct. 897 (2020). For earlier
litigation in the Busby case, see,
e.g., Busby v. Davis, 892 F. 3d

turn fail-to
be
executed

735 (5th Cir. 2018) and Busby
v. Davis, 677 F. App'x 884 (5th
Cir. 2017).
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Butler, Steven
Anthony

Butler v. Stephens, 625 F.
App'x 641 (5th Cir. 2015), cert

501
Maybe a
success

den., 136 S. Ct. 1656 (2016).
For earlier litigation in the
Butler case, see, e.g., Butler v.

Stephens, 600 F. App'x 246
(5th Cir. 2015).
In re Campbell, 750 F. 3d 523

Yes

(5th Cir. 2014) For earlier
litigation in the Campbellcase,
see, e.g., Campbell v. Dretke,

Successlifeeligible for

117 F. App'x 946 (5th Cir.
2004), cert den., 546 U.S. 1015
(2005) and In re Campbell, 82
F. App'x 349, 350 (5th Cir.
2003).

parole

Cathey, Eric

Cathey v. Davis (In re Cathey),

Yes

Dewayne

857 F. 3d 221 (5th Cir. 2017).

Maybe a

Chase, Ricky R

In re Chase, 804 F. 3d 738 (5th
Cir. 2015).

Yes
Maybe a

Chester, Elroy

Chester v. Thaler, 666 F. 3d 340
(5th Cir. 2011), cert den., 568
U.S. 978 (2012), supplemented

Campbell,
RobertJames

success

success

No
Failure

on other grounds, sub.. nom.,

Chester v. Thaler, 671 F. 3d 494
(5th Cir. 2012). For earlier
litigation in the Chester case,
see, e.g., Chester v. Cockrell, 62

F. App'x 556 (5th Cir. 2003).
Clark, James Lee

Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F. 3d

No

441 (5th Cir. 2006), cert den.,
549 U.S. 1254 (2007).

Failure
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Eldridge, Gerald
Cornelius

Eldridge v. Davis, 661 F. App'x
253 (5th Cir. 2016), cert den.,
137 S. Ct. 2215 (2017). For

[Vol. 11:3
No
Failure

earlier litigation in the Eldridge
case, see, e.g., Eldridge v.

Stephens, 599 F. App'x 123
(5th Cir. 2015); Eldridge v.
Stephens 608 F. App'x 289 (5th
Cir. 2015); and Eldridge v.
Quarterman, 325 F. App'x 322

(5th Cir. 2009).
Esparza,

Esparza v. Thaler, 408 F. App'x

No

Guadalupe

787 (5th Cir. 2010), cert den.,
563 U.S. 992 (2011).

Failure

Garcia, Juan

Garcia v. Stephens, 757 F. 3d

No

Martin

220 (5th Cir. 2014), cert den.,
574 U.S. 1193 (2015).

Failure

Guevara, Gilmar
Alexander

Guevara v. Davis, 679 F. App'x
332 (5th Cir. 2017), cert den.,

No
failure

138 S. Ct. 554 (2015). For
earlier litigation in the Guevara
case, see, e.g., Guevara v.

Stephens, 577 F. App'x 364
(5th Cir. 2014).
Hall, Michael
Wayne

Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F. 3d
365 (5th Cir. 2008 on remand to,
Hall v. Quarterman,

Partial
Partial
turned

2009 WL 612559 (N.D. Tex.

failure-

2009), certificate of appealability
den. sub. nom., Hall v. Thaler

executed

597 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 981
(2010).
For earlier litigation in the Hall
case, see, e.g., Hall v.
Quarterman, 236 F. App'x 10

(5th Cir. 2007).
Harris, Robert

Harris v. Thaler, 464 F. App'x

No

Wayne

301 (5th Cir. 2012), cert den.
and stay den., 567 U.S. 966
(2012).

Failure
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Hearn, Yokamon
Laneal

Hearn v. Thaler, 669 F. 3d 265
(5th Cir. 2012), cert den., 576
U.S. 954 (2012). For earlier
litigation in the Hearn case, see,
e.g.,

503
Partial
Partial
turned
failureexecuted

In re Hearn, 418 F. 3d 444 (5th
Cir. 2005); Hearn v. Dretke (In
reYokamon Laneal Hearn),

376 F. 3d 447 (5th Cir. 2004);
and Hearn v. Dretke, 389 F. 3d

122 (5th Cir. 2004).
Henderson,
James Lee

Henderson v. Davis, 868 F. 3d
314 (5th Cir. 2017). For earlier
litigation in the Henderson case,
see, e.g., Henderson v.

Yes (SCR)
Successlife

Stephens, 791 F. 3d 567 (5th
Cir. 2015); Henderson v.

Thaler, 626 F. 3d 773 (5th Cir.
2010); and In re Henderson,

462 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2006).
Hernandez,

Hernandez v. Stephens, 537 F.

No

Ramiro

App'x 531 (5th Cir. 2013), cert
den., 572 U.S. 1036 (2014).

Failure

Hernandez,

Hernandez v. Thaler, 398 F.

No

Rodrigo

App'x 81 (5th Cir. 2010), cert
den., 563 U.S. 940 (2011).
Hines v. Thaler, 456 F. App'x
357 (5th Cir. 2011), cert den.,
566 U.S. 997 (2012). For

Failure

Hines, Bobby
Lee

subsequent litigation, see Ex

parte Hines, 2012 WL 4928863
(Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 15,
2012) (dismissing writ of
habeas corpus, and denying
stay of execution).

No
Failure
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Ibarra, Ramiro

Rubi

Ibarra v. Davis, 786 F. App'x
420 (5th Cir. 2019), cert den.,
207 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2020). For

[Vol. 11:3
No
Failure

earlier litigation in the Eldridge
case, see, e.g., Ibarra v. Davis,

738 F. App'x 814 (5th Cir.
2018); Ibarra v. Stephens, 723
F. 3d 599 (5th Cir. 2013);
Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F. 3d 222
(5th Cir. 2012); and Ibarra v.
Thaler, 691 F. 3d 677 (5th Cir.
2012).
Johnson, Derrick

In reJohnson, 325 F. App'x 337

No

Lamone

(5th Cir. 2009).

Failure

Johnson, Dexter

Johnson v. Davis (In re

Yes

Johnson), 935 F. 3d 284 (5th

Maybe a

Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.

success

Ct. 2521 (2020). For earlier
litigation in the Johnson case,
see, e.g., Johnson v. Stephens,

617 F. App'x 293 (5th Cir.
2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 980
(2016).
Johnson, Kia

In reJohnson, 334 F. 3d 403

No

Levoy
Ladd, Robert
Charles

(5th Cir. 2003).
Ladd v. Livingston, 777 F. 3d
286 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
574 U.S. 1144 (2015). For

Failure
Partial
Partial
turned

earlier litigation in the Ladd
case, see, e.g., Ladd v.

failureexecuted

Stephens, 748 F. 3d 637 (5th
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S.
880 (2014).
In re Lewis, 484 F. 3d 793 (5th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.

No
Failure

Lewis, David Lee

1141 (2008).
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Lewis, Rickey
Lynn

Long, Steven
Lynn
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Lewis v. Thaler, 701 F. 3d 783
(5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569
U.S. 910 (2013). For earlier

Partial
Partial
turned

litigation in the Lewis case, see,
e.g.,
Lewis v. Quarterman, 541 F. 3d

failureexecuted

280 (5th Cir. 2008) and Lewis
v. Quarterman, 272 F. App'x
347 (5th Cir. 2008).
Long v. Davis, 706 F. App'x 181
(5th Cir. 2017), supplemented on

Yes (SCR)
Maybe a

other grounds, sub.. nom., Long v.

success

Davis, 138 S. Ct. 72 (2017). For
earlier litigation in the Long
case, see, e.g., Long v. Davis,

Partial
Partial
turned

litigation in the Maldonado
case, see, e.g., Maldonado v.

failure
On death

Thaler, 5th Cir. 2010 U.S. App
LEXIS 17735 and Maldonado
v. Thaler, 389 F. App'x 399
(5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 565
U.S. 829 (2011).

row

Martinez v. Davis, 653 F. App'x
308 (5th Cir. 2016),
supplemented on other grounds,
sub. nom., Martinez v. Davis, 137

Yes (SCR)
Success
died in
prison

.

Maldonado,
Virgilio

663 F. App'x 361 (5th Cir.
2016).
Maldondao v. Thaler, 625 F. 3d
229 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 829 (2011). For earlier

Martinez,
Raymond Deleon

S. Ct. 1432 (2017).
Matamoros,John

Matamoros v. Stephens, 783 F.

Partial

Reyes

3d 212 (5th Cir. 2015). For

Partial

earlier litigation in the
Matamoros case, see, e.g.,
Matamoros v. Stephens, 539 F.

turned
failuredied in

App'x 487 (5th Cir. 2013).

prison
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Mathis, Milton
Wuzael

Mays, Randall
Wayne
Moore, Curtis
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Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F. 3d 461

Partial

(5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562

Partial

U.S. 1257 (2011). For earlier

turned

litigation in the Mathis case,
see, e.g.,

failureexecuted

In re Mathis, 483 F. 3d 395 (5th
Cir. 2007) and Mathis v.
Dretke, 124 F. App'x 865 (5th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
1131 (2005).
Mays v. Stephens, 757 F. 3d 211
(5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 574
U.S. 1082 (2015).

No
Failure

Moore v. Quarterman, 517 F.

No

3d 781 (5th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 842 (2008).

Failure

Moore, Eric

Moore v. Quarterman, 342 F.

Yes

Lynn

App'x 65 (5th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 559 U.S. 998 (2010). For

Successlife

earlier litigation in the Moore
case, see, e.g., Moore v.

Quarterman, 533 F. 3d 338
(5th Cir. 2008); Moore v.
Quarterman, 520 F. 3d 504

(5th Cir. 2008); Moore v.
Quarterman, 491 F. 3d 213
(5th Cir. 2007); Moore v.
Quarterman, 454 F. 3d 484

(5th Cir. 2006); Moore v.
Dretke, 369 F. 3d 844 (5th Cir.
2004); and In re Moore, 67 F.
App'x 25 (5th Cir. 2003).
Moreno, Jose

Moreno v. Dretke, 450 F. 3d

No

Angel

158 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1120 (2007).

Failure
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Morris, Kenneth

Morris v. Quarterman, 275 F.

Yes

Wayne

App'x 292 (5th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 904 (2008),

Partial
turned

supplemented on other grounds,
sub. Nom., Morris v. Dretke, 413

failureexecuted

F. 3d 484 (5th Cir. 2005);
Morris v. Dretke, 379 F. 3d 199
(5th Cir. 2004); and In re
Morris, 328 F. 3d 739 (5th Cir.
2003).
In re Nealy, 223 F. App'x 366
(5th Cir. 2007).
In re Neville, 440 F. 3d 220 (5th

No
Failure
No

Nealy, Charles
Anthony
Neville, Robert
James

Cir. 2006), supplemented on other
grounds, sub. Nom., Neville v.

Failure

Johnson, 440 F. 3d 221 (2006),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1161
(2006).
Perkins,

Perkins v. Quarterman, 254 F.

No

Reginald

App'x 366 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1067 (2008).
Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F. 3d 197

Failure

Pierce, Anthony
L

(5th Cir. 2010). For earlier
litigation in the Moore case, see,
e.g., Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F.

Yes
Success
Life

Ripkowski, Britt
Allen

App'x 784 (5th Cir. 2009).
Ripkowski v. Thaler, 438 F.
App'x 296 (2011), cert. denied,
565 U.S. 1205 (2012).

No
Failure

Rivera, Jose

Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.

Yes

Alfredo

3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 827 (2008).
Rockwell v. Davis, 853 F. 3d 758
(5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 215 (2017).

Maybe a
success
No
Failure

Rosales v. Quarterman, 565 F.

Partial

3d 308 (5th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 556 U.S. 1176 (2009).

turned
failure;

For earlier litigation in the
Rosales case, see, e.g., Rosales v.
Quarterman, 291 F. App'x 558

executed

Rockwell, Kwame
A
Rosales, Michael

(5th Cir. 2008).
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Salazar, Robert
Madrid

In re Salazar, 443 F. 3d 430 (5th
Cir. 2006). For earlier litigation

[Vol. 11:3
No
Failure

in the Salazarcase, see, e.g.,

Segundo, Juan

Salazar v. Dretke, 419 F. 3d 384
(5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547
U.S. 1006 (2006).
Segundo v. Davis, 831 F. 3d 345

No

Ramon Meza

(5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137

Failure

S. Ct. 1068 (2017).
Shisinday,

Shisinday v. Quarterman, 511

No

Shozdijiji

Failure

Shore, Anthony

F. 3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 815 (2008).
Shore v. Davis, 845 F. 3d 627
(5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 88 (2017).

Simpson,

Simpson v. Quarterman, 341 F.

Partial

Danielle

App'x 68 (5th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 558 U.S. 1039 (2009).

turned
failure;

For earlier litigation in the
Simpson case, see, e.g., Simpson
v. Quarterman, 291 F. App'x

executed

No
Failure

Smith, Robert

622 (5th Cir. 2008).
Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F. 3d 661

No

(5th Cir. 2002), cert. granted in

Failure

Soliz, Mark

part, 539 U.S. 986 (2003), cert.
dismissed, 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
In re Soliz, 938 F. 3d 200 (5th

No

Anthony

Cir. 2019). For earlier litigation
in the Soliz case, see, e.g.,

Failure

Soliz v. Davis, 750 F. App'x 282
(5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 1447 (2019).
Sorto, Walter
Alexander

Sparks, Robert

Sorto v. Davis, 716 F. App'x 366
(5th Cir. 2018). For earlier
litigation in the Sorto case, see,

Yes
Maybe a
success

e.g., Sorto v. Davis, 881 F. 3d
933 (5th Cir. 2018); Sorto v.
Davis, 859 F. 3d 356 (5th Cir.
2017); and Sorto v. Davis, 672
F. App'x 342 (5th Cir. 2016).
In re Sparks, 939 F. 3d 630 (5th

No

Cir. 2019).

Failure
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Tamayo, Edgar
Arias

Tamayo v. Stephens, 740 F. 3d
991 (5th Cir. 2014). For earlier
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No
Failure

litigation in the Tamayo case,
see, e.g., Tamayo v. Perry, 553

Taylor, Elkie Lee

F. App'x 395 (5th Cir. 2014); In
reTamayo, 552 F. App'x 371
(5th Cir. 2014); Tamayo v.
Thaler, 5th Cir. 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26665, and Tamayo v.
Thaler, 5th Cir. 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26671.
In re Taylor, 298 F. App'x 385
No
(5th Cir. 2008). For earlier
Failure
litigation in the Taylor case, see,
e.g., Taylor v. Quarterman, 498

F. 3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1298 (2008).
Thomas,
Kenneth

Dewayne

Thomas v. Quarterman, 335 F.
App'x 386 (5th Cir. 2009), cert.

Yes
Success;

denied, 558 U.S. 1117 (2010).

life or

For earlier litigation in
the Thomas case, see, e.g., In re

possibly
less

Thomas, 225 F. App'x 222 (5th
Cir. 2007) and Thomas v.
Cockrell, 54 F. App'x 591
(2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
965
(2003).
Turner, Edwin

Turner v. Epps, 460 F. App'x

Hart
Ward, Adam
Kelly

322 (5th Cir. 2012).
Failure
Ward v. Stephens, 777 F. 3d
No
250 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, Failure
136 S. Ct. 86 (2015).
Weathers v. Davis, 659 F. App'x Yes (SCR)
778 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated and Maybe a

Weathers, Obie
D

remanded, Weathers v. Davis,

138 S. Ct. 315, 199 L. Ed. 2d
203 (2017).

No

success
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Webster, Bruce
Carneil

In re Webster, 605 F. 3d 256
(5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562
U.S. 1091 (2010). For earlier
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No
Failure

litigation in the Webster case,
see, e.g.,
United States v. Webster, 421 F.

3d 308 (5th Cir. 2005),
rehearingen banc den., 174 F.

App'x 863 (5th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 828 (2006) and
United States v. Webster, 392 F.

Wiley, William

3d 787 (5th Cir. 2004).
Wiley v. Epps, 625 F. 3d 199
(5th Cir. 2010).

Yes
Success,
but died
on death
row

Williams, Clifton

Williams v. Stephens, 761 F. 3d

No

Lamar

561 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,

Failure

Williams, Jeffrey
Demond

575 U.S. 952 (2015).
Williams v. Thaler, 602 F. 3d
291 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 506 (2010). For

No
Failure

earlier litigation in the Williams
case, see, e.g., Williams v.

Quarterman, 293 F. App'x 298
(5th Cir. 2008).
Wilson, Marvin

Wilson v. Thaler, 450 F. App'x

Partial

Lee

369 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied
and stay den., 567 U.S. 958

Turned
failure;

(2012). For earlier litigation in
the Wilson case, see, e.g., In re

executed

Wood, David
Leonard
Woods, Bobby
Wayne

Wilson, 442 F. 3d 872 (5th Cir.
2006) and In re Wilson, 433 F.
3d 451 (5th Cir. 2005).
In re Wood, 648 F. App'x 388
(5th Cir. 2016).

No
Failure

Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F. 3d
580 (5th Cir. 2007). For earlier
litigation in the Woods case, see,
e.g., In re Woods, 155 F. App'x

Partial
turned
failure;
executed

132 (5th Cir. 2005).
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APPENDIX C

Butler: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded to habeas court "to consider evidence in light of the Moore Iand H opinions and to make a recommendation to this Court on the issue of
intellectual disability."3 11 According to counsel, the district attorney
is seeking to bring in a new expert in to test Butler and has said that
if his full-scale IQ is 75 or below, he will settle.1 12
Campbell: Case was ultimately resolved in federal court without an evidentiary hearing. The Attorney General hired an expert
to review the extensive documentary evidence concerning Campbell's background, and he apparently advised them that the defendant was likely to prevail on his Atkins claim, so a stipulated order was
agreed to, finding that the defendant had an intellectual disability.313 Campbell was subsequently re-sentenced to life in prison with
the possibility of parole. 314 His counsel believes the likelihood that
Robert will ever be released on parole is "very small."313
Cathey: No response from counsel.
Chase: No response from counsel.

Johnson: After the Fifth Circuit entered a stay of execution
and authorized the successor petition, Johnson's case was remanded to the district court. His counsel filed a new habeas petition

311.

Ex parteButler, No. WR-41,121-03, slip op. at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019)

(per curiam) (on Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Cause No. 511112 in the 185th
District Court, Harris County) (on file with authors).
312. E-mail from Richard Burr, appellate counsel for Butler, to the authors (June 8,
2020) (on file with authors).
313.

See Joint Advisory Concerning Campbell's Intellectual Disability Claim at *7,

Campbell v. Davis, No. 4:00-cv-03844 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2017) (on file with authors).
314. He was reviewed in early 2018 for possible release on parole. Parole was officially
denied on March 2, 2018 and he was given a seven-year "set-off," meaning that his next
parole review was scheduled for February 2025. See ParoleReview Infbrmation, TEX. DEP'T OF
CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,

https://offender.tdcj.texas.gov/OffenderSearch/reviewDetail.ac-

tion?sid=04286378&tdcj=02141630&fullName=CAMPBELL%2CROBERT+JAMES
ited Dec. 29, 2020).
315.

(last vis-

E-mail from Robert Owen, appellate counsel for Campbell, to the authors (June

8, 2020) (on file with authors).
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raising the Atkins claim, asking for a new hearing, and arguing that
the defendant's intellectual disability is relevant to tolling (on the
question of his diligence in pursuing his rights) .316 His lawyer believes the "odds are pretty good" that such a hearing will be scheduled. 317
Long: Defendant has recently had a state habeas evidentiary
hearing; there has been no decision as of yet. 318
Moore: Appellate counsel has had no contact with defendant since sentence commuted. 319
Pierce: Currently serving life sentence. 320
Rivera: The district court agreed to abate the case so that
counsel could seek a commutation of the defendant's sentence.
Counsel filed a request with the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and that board unanimously agreed that defendant's sentence should be commuted to life without parole based on his intellectual disability. Counsel asked Governor Rick Perry to
commute his sentence (as part of the commutation process in
Texas, the Governor must agree to commutation). Over a six-year
period, this was never acted upon by then-Governor Perry. Although the trialjudge administratively abated the case in 2014, since
Governor Abbott took office in 2015, the defendant has remained
on death row (but without an execution date) since 2003.
The district judge issued an Order on May 11, 2020 asking
whether to go forward with a hearing on equitable tolling. Counsel
then (1) sent a letter to Governor Abbott on May 23, 2020, asking
to have Mr. Rivera's sentence commuted to life without parole, and

316.

See Amended Second or Successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at *1, *31,

*51-52,Johnson v. Davis, No. 4:19-CV-03047 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2019) (on file with authors).
317. E-mail from Jessica Graf, appellate counsel for Johnson, to the authors (June 8,
2020) (on file with authors); E-mail fromJeremy Schepers, appellate counsel for Johnson,
to the authors (July 15, 2020) (on file with authors).
318. E-mail from Scott Smith, appellate counsel for Moore, to the authors (June 8,
2020) (on file with authors) (noting that Long's last four IQ tests were scored at 62, 63, 64,
and 63, an "amazing consistency").

319. Id.; see also Moore v. Dretke, No. Civ.A. 603CV224, 2005 WL 1606437, at *12 (E.D.
Tex. 2005).
320. E-mail from David Dow, appellate counsel for Pierce, to the authors (June 8, 2020)
(on file with authors).

MAN IS OPPOSEDTO FAIR PLAY

2021 ]

513

(2) filed ajoint Advisory with the district court, informing the court
of these proceedings, and asking the court to give the Governor
time to act.
In light of the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal ap-

peals in Ex ParteMoore, 587 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2019),
counsel remains "hopeful" that Governor Abbott will commute Rivera's sentence. 321
Sorto: Counsel has obtained funding to do additional texting on question of intellectual disability. 322
Thomas: No response from counsel.
Weathers: Counsel is working on a state successor petition,
following remand from Supreme Court on basis of Moore case. 323

321. E-mail from Cathy Smith, appellate counsel for Rivera, to the authors (June 8,
2020) (on file with authors).
322.

E-mail from David Dow, appellate counsel for Pierce, to the authors (June 8, 2020)

(on file with authors).
323.

E-mail from John "Bud" Ritenour, current counsel for Weathers, to the authors

(July 13, 2020) (on file with authors).

